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Abstract 
The Distributed Cognitive Walkthrough: 
The Impact of Differences in Cognitive Theory on Usability Evaluation 
Joel U. Eden 
Michael E. Atwood, Ph.D. 
 
 
A primary goal of usability related fields is the creation of products and services 
that conform to or leverage theoretical views of human cognition. Therefore, most 
usability related methodologies are directly based on theories of human cognition. 
Existing user-centered design (UCD) methods are based on cognitivist theoretical views, 
which hold that the locus of cognition is the brain. Opposing post-cognitivist views 
within the cognitive science field, such as distributed and extended cognition are not 
represented in current UCD methods. Our research represents a first step towards 
understanding the impact of differences between these opposing theories of cognition on 
usability evaluation and design. In examining the differential impact of opposing 
cognitive views (cognitivist versus post-cognitivist), three main research questions were 
explored using two experimental studies. 
 The first experimental study explored the impact of walkthrough evaluation 
methods with a focus on an individual user versus a focus on interaction between internal 
and external resources, and the number of users in a scenario on the actionability, 
usability relevance, and reported severity of usability evaluations. Usability evaluations 
were conducted by 42 participants using either the Cognitive Walkthrough (representing 
cognitivist theoretical views) or the Distributed Cognitive Walkthrough (novel method 
developed as part of this research, representing the distributed and extended cognitive 
views) with scenarios set in a coffee shop. Use of two-way ANOVA showed a significant 
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increase in all three dependent measures (actionability, usability relevance, and reported 
severity), with use of the Distributed Cognitive Walkthrough method over the Cognitive 
Walkthrough method. 
 A second experimental study explored the impact of materiality of 
artifacts (paper cup versus digital interface) on the actionability, usability relevance, and 
reported severity of usability evaluations. Usability evaluations were conducted by 22 
participants using the Distributed Cognitive Walkthrough with scenarios set in a coffee 
shop that focused on either a paper coffee cup or a digital order tracking system interface. 
Use of ANOVA showed a significant increase in reported severity for scenarios with the 
digital interface over scenarios with the paper cup. While differences in actionability and 
usability relevance by materiality were non-significant, interesting aspects of the 
differences are discussed. 
 Beyond the individual results stated above, our findings suggest that an increased 
focus on the interaction of internal and external cognitive resources and variation in 
materiality of these resources during evaluation can result in making useful, yet invisible 
resources more visible, with respect to how an activity is being accomplished. This aspect 
of addressing the paradoxical invisibility of useful and usable artifacts is a key 
contribution of this research, showing how even simple differences in evaluation and 
design methods can aid in making visible these complex interactions between internal 
and external resources for cognition. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
One of the main goals of interaction design and usability fields is the application 
of valid theories of how people interact with the world and think (theories of cognition) 
to the design of useful and usable artifacts, products, and services. Although cognitive 
science theory has moved forward since the first time these cognitive theories were 
applied to the practice of usability related work, newer views on cognition are currently 
underrepresented in the practical methods that make up user-centered design (UCD). 
Cognitive science research and theories that go by names such as distributed or extended 
cognition argue that the way we interact with the world and think is through the selection, 
creation, and use of ephemeral (cognitive) systems made up of internal (brain) and 
external resources. These interactions of internal and external resources, which are for the 
most part invisible, in many cases can be viewed as the “cognitive” resources themselves, 
beyond the constituent parts that are taking part in the interaction. With the focus of 
distributed and external cognition on external information, and the coordination between 
internal and external representations, usability methods based on distributed cognition 
may aid in going beyond the usefulness of current UCD methods. 
Our research represents the comparison of current differing views in the cognitive 
science field applied to usability practice through the comparison of walkthrough 
usability evaluation methods based on cognitivist and post-cognitivist theories of 
cognition. Because such a practical method does not exist for the distributed and 
extended cognitive side of the comparison, our research included the development and 
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subsequent evaluation of a walkthrough usability evaluation method based on theories of 
distributed cognition, Distributed Cognition (Hutchins, 1995a; Hollan et al., 2002; 
Rogers, 1997), Distributed Cognitive Tasks (Zhang & Norman, 1994), Distributed 
Intelligence (Pea, 1993; Pea 2004), and Extended Cognition (Clark, 1997). The 
Distributed Cognitive Walkthrough (DCW) method is useful for the identification of 
aspects of usability issues related to interaction between people, artifacts, and 
information, across dimensions such as time, space, and social structures. The DCW 
method was developed with two main related objectives in mind; 1) embodiment of 
principles of distributed cognitive theory, while also 2) being practically useful by 
novices in generating actionable information regarding usability issues. 
This research compares use of the DCW method to use of an existing, more 
cognitivist-inspired method with a similar structure, the Cognitive Walkthrough method 
(Polson et al., 1992; Sharp, et al., 2002).  Our analysis of experimental use of these two 
walkthrough methods focused on the actionability, usability relevance, reported usability 
severity, and nature of cognitive resource attribution (human versus artifacts) of potential 
usability findings discovered.  
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Figure 1. Graphical overview of motivation for this research. Cognitivist theories are well 
represented in practical methods, while distributed and extended cognitive views are not 
represented. Methods based on distributed and extended theories have unfortunately only 
been used by the researchers who developed the methods. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Evaluation as Design 
 
“...she takes Northover’s comments as a criticism of her drawing, yet it is clear that she 
sees drawing not as thought-experimenting but as a way of presenting ideas. Northover 
seems to be saying ‘You are not really designing at all. You are simply having ‘ideas’ 
and putting them down on paper. The moves you make have consequences that are 
testable, but you must draw to scale and in section in order to test them. The whole 
process of designing is lost to you because you will not do these things.’” (Schon, 1990, 
p. 130) 
 
 Christopher Alexander argues that it is easier to recognize misfit between a 
designed artifact and its context of use than it is to recognize fit (Alexander, 1979). Henry 
Petroski (Petroski, 2006) shares this same view when he proposes that irritation, not 
necessity, is the mother of invention. 
 The above quote from Donald Schon (1990) may make interaction designers 
jealous of architects; imagine if all you had to do to get an estimate of the usability of a 
set of alternative designs was to “draw to scale and in section to test them” a priori. 
Schon’s concept of reflection-in-action places emphasis on the opportunity for designers 
to see the consequence of each design move. Relating Schon and Alexander, reflection-
in-action can be fostered by providing designers with pseudo-immediate feedback 
regarding the consequence (misfit) of their design assumptions on the context of use. As 
the time between design choices and feedback increases, the opportunity for reflection-in-
action fades away towards reflection-on-action, and it is a slippery slope beyond this 
towards our current state of waiting weeks, months (i.e., too late to be useful) to get 
results of usability testing in order to understand the consequence of design choices. 
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 Two distinct types of misfit are relevant to a discussion of reflection-in-action; the 
first is the misfit that Alexander discusses, which is a misfit between form and the context 
of use; a second level of misfit has to do with whether or not the designer is surprised by 
the existence of misfits of the first type. With the immediacy of feedback of this second 
type being key to enabling reflection-in-action; surprise-in-action can be more valuable 
than surprise later on because the surprise-in-action may be related to tacit assumptions 
embedded in design choices. The field of design rationale has yet to find useful ways to 
make visible and record these assumptions, so these tacit assumptions may best be dealt 
with during the very tacit reflection-in-action time frame. Reflective designers realize that 
there can be no perfect design, so as the conversation with the design situation takes place 
certain misfits will be unexpected, and will therefore cause surprise (sometimes referred 
to as breakdowns). These surprises could be the most valuable aspect of reflection-in-
action, in that each surprise represents a difference between design(er) assumptions and 
the context of use. 
 
2.2 Usability Evaluation Methods (UEMs) 
 
Many designers are moving beyond traditional Human Computer Interaction 
(HCI) views of design, now viewing design as more than the design of individual 
products to interact with in a snapshot of time, and instead designing interactions among 
people, artifacts, and information (Buxton, 2007; Saffer, 2006) over dimensions such as 
time, space, and social structures. This view of design goes by many differing names 
such as Interaction Design, Service Design, and User Experience Design, but all share the 
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idea that design thinking needs to transcend static (in time, space, and social dimensions) 
views of how people, artifacts, and information interact. 
As the above section on evaluation as design stresses, design and evaluation are 
in many ways conceptually inseparable (Wania et al., 2006), but are in fact unavoidably 
separated in the practical world by process and resource constraints. Therefore, it is often 
the case that designers and evaluators have different perspectives, education, and most 
relevant to this research, methodological groundings. It may be ideal then for evaluation 
methods and techniques to share underlying (compatible) fundamental theoretical views 
of the design processes that created what is to be evaluated, so those who use such 
methods will be on common ground even if only unknowingly through use of the 
methods. 
Most design and evaluation methods in the interaction design and usability fields 
are grounded in specific theories of cognition. For example, methods may be based on 
cognitivist theories, such as the popular Information Processing and Symbol Systems 
models of cognition, which place the concept of cognition physically in the human brain. 
Alternatively, methods may be grounded in a fundamentally different theoretical 
perspective, such as post-cognitivist theories of cognition (e.g., Distributed Cognition, 
Activity Theory, Situated Cognition).  
Many usability methods were developed by researchers based on a specific 
cognitive theory, and in many cases based on a theory developed by the same researcher. 
Therefore, use of this theory-based method by this researcher would be very different 
than when used by an evaluator not familiar with the underlying theory. In general, 
practitioners unaware of these underlying theories are therefore unaware that particular 
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theoretical cognitive perspectives are guiding their own practice. This becomes an issue 
when in order to keep up with increased interest in usability and user experience, 
companies must, because of resource constraints allow usability related work to be done 
by more novice workers. Unfortunately for those needing to choose an appropriate 
method (using the literature), most new usability evaluation or design methods when 
presented in the literature are presented via case studies, as opposed to experimental 
comparison with other methods, or as used by evaluators other then the creators of the 
method (Bertlesen, 2004; Pinelle & Gutwin, 2002). 
Our research involves the development and evaluation of a method to aid in the 
evaluation of interactions between people, artifacts, and information, across dimensions 
such as time, space, and social structure, providing designers with valuable ‘talk back’ 
(Schon, 1990) in the form of usability related implications of design choices. The 
proposed method is based on Distributed Cognition (i.e., one of the above mentioned 
post-cognitive based methods), and will be compared to the Cognitive Walkthrough 
method, an existing usability evaluation method that is based on a theory of exploratory 
learning more closely related to the cognitivist view of cognition. The Cognitive 
Walkthrough method is useful for this research because it is a so-called “discount” 
evaluation method (represented by four questions answerable by novices), and it is 
presented by its creators in a manner that places it directly in the cognitivist camp: “The 
cognitive walkthrough is a practical evaluation technique grounded in Lewis and Polson's 
CE+ theory of exploratory learning. The CE+ theory is an information- processing model 
of human cognition.” (Reiman, et. al, 1995) 
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Existing HCI walkthrough evaluation methods, such as the Cognitive 
Walkthrough (Polson et al., 1992), focus on usability issues related to atomic, low level 
interactions between an individual user and a graphical user interface in a snapshot of 
time. The contribution of the proposed Distributed Cognitive Walkthrough (DCW) 
method to research and practice is to understand how to transcend this focus on low level 
interactions that miss more systemic usability issues by identifying usability issues 
related to how these individual-interface moments interact over time and space. 
Moreover, the proposed DCW method uses concepts from distributed cognitive theory to 
view interaction between people and information as transcending interactions with 
graphical user interfaces, allowing the DCW method to be useful for evaluation of design 
ideas in many areas of interaction design; for example, evaluation of ubiquitous 
computing, service design (e.g., coffee shop customer/worker experience), and 
mathematical notations (e.g., Newton versus Leibniz Calculus notation). Therefore, many 
of the types of potential usability issues that the DCW method exposes will be related to 
interactions that may either be missed or seem too trivial to report using many existing 
evaluation methods, but actually have the potential to leave small residual interaction 
effects that build over time to create systemic usability issues. These systemic usability 
issues really should be attributed to interactions over time, space, and social structure 
rather than attributed to any single interaction with a specific interface, product, or 
service element. 
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2.3 Cognition Extended Beyond the Human Brain 
 
This section introduces the concept of distributed and extended cognition. 
Although many related theories and frameworks exist, the proposed research relies most 
heavily on the specific theories and frameworks presented below in this, and the 
following sections. 
Intelligence, cognition, and knowledge are words that are usually associated with 
an individual person, and moreover usually that individual’s brain. Recent views in the 
field of cognitive science (Clark, 1997) are questioning the physical boundary of the 
human brain as the boundary for the concept of intelligence, cognition, and knowledge. 
Knowledge can be viewed as residing “in the world,” as well as the more commonly held 
view of knowledge “in the head.” (Norman, 1993). 
In many cases, theories of distributed and extended cognition (and related 
theories) are referred to as members of the family of post-cognitivist theories (Kaptelinin 
& Nardi, 2006), to be contrasted with cognitivist theories that definitively place the locus 
of cognition in the physical human brain. To add clarity to later references to cognitivist 
versus post-cognitivist theories, and cognition in general, two generic definitions of 
cognition, as well as definitions of cognitivist and post-cognitivist views of cognition are 
now provided, with an expectation that these definitions are useful for framing later 
references to cognitive theories in this proposal, and are not an attempt to provide 
definitions necessarily appropriate beyond this dissertation. The two generic definitions 
of cognition are provided with the goal of stating what cognition is, without stating where 
it is; the two later cognitivist and post-cognitivist definitions take on the task of stating 
where (and how) the respective theories would place cognition. 
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Cognition, generic definition 1: The process of knowing and, more precisely, the 
process of being aware, knowing, thinking, learning and judging. 
 
Cognition, generic definition 2: The representation and transformation of information 
for the accomplishment of a task. 
 
Cognitivist (e.g., Information Processing & Symbol Systems Models) view of cognition: 
Discrete, internal mental states (representations or symbols) whose manipulation can be 
described in terms of rules or algorithms. 
 
Post-Cognitivist (e.g., Distributed Cognition) view of cognition: Coordination of 
internal (i.e., human brain) and external resources, for the accomplishment of a task. 
 
 
Clark and Chalmers (1998, p. 2) make clear (at least relative to the cognitivist 
view) why it is proper to refer to cognition outside of the brain as “cognition,” in what 
they call the ‘Parity Principle,’ “If as we confront some task, a part of the world functions 
as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing 
as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the 
cognitive process. Cognitive processes ain’t (all) in the head!” (Emphasis present in 
original text). 
 The following sections introduce in more detail the four main contributing 
theoretical views of distributed and extended cognition. These main contributing views 
are Distributed Cognition (Hutchins, 1995a; Hollan et al., 2002; Rogers, 1997), 
Distributed Cognitive Tasks (Zhang & Norman, 1994), Distributed Intelligence (Pea, 
1993; Pea, 2004), and Extended Cognition (Clark, 1997). 
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Distributed Cognition 
 
Distributed Cognition (Hutchins 1995a; Hollan et al., 2002; Rogers, 1997) is a theory 
of cognition that views cognitive functionality as “computation as propagation of 
representational state across representation media.” Three main principles of Distributed 
Cognition as a theory of cognition which distance it from other cognitive theories are 
listed below: 
1. Cognitive processes may be distributed across the members of a social group.  
 
2. Cognitive processes may involve coordination between internal and external 
(material or environmental) structure.  
 
3. Processes may be distributed through time in such a way that the products of 
earlier events can transform the nature of later events. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. From “How a Cockpit Remembers Its Speeds” (Hutchins, 1995b); image taken 
from (Wright et al., 1996).  
 
 
 
 Hutchins (1995b) uses the case of pilots in an airplane cockpit to demonstrate 
how multiple representations of the same information (a specific safe speed threshold in 
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this case) are possible that place different requirements on how the information can be 
accessed. For example, a safe speed threshold can be held in short or long term memory 
(Figure 1, b), or it may be physically marked using a speed bug that is placed on the 
external speed display (Figure 2, a). Accessing this information from human internal 
memory requires a possibly error-prone retrieval, whereas accessing the same 
information from the physical placement of the speed bug is less error-prone, and should 
therefore be preferred in the example of a busy cockpit. Retrieving the information from 
the external world makes good use of the perceptual abilities of a human, representing a 
task of recognition, rather than internal memory recall. 
 
Distributed Cognitive Tasks 
 
Research in Distributed Cognitive Tasks focuses on how differing isomorphic 
distributions of information and operations required by an abstract task structure over 
internal and external representations constrains, biases, and defines the resultant task that 
must be carried out by a human (Zhang & Norman, 1994; Zhang, 1997a; Zhang, 1997b). 
See Figure 3 below for a diagrammatic representation of how both information and 
operations can be viewed as being distributed across internal and external representations 
(Zhang, 1997b). 
A major relationship between Distributed Cognitive Tasks theory to Hutchins’ 
Distributed Cognition can be seen in the similarity to Hutchins’ emphasis on the 
transformation of complex internal cognitive tasks into simpler (for the brain) perceptual 
or recognition tasks (Hutchins, 1995b) (see Figure 2 above). Zhang (1997b, p. 180) 
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claims that “information in external representations can be picked up, analyzed, and 
processed by perceptual systems alone,” and that “generally speaking, perceptual 
operations require less attentional and working memory resources than [more error 
prone] cognitive operations” (p. 186). In Figure 3 below, this would relate to preferring a 
design that requires Perceptual Operations and Directly Perceived Information as 
opposed to Cognitive Operations and Directly Retrieved Information. What is especially 
interesting, and powerful to note is that cognitive operations (e.g., mathematics done “in 
the head”) can be represented externally (i.e., “Perceptual Operations” in the figure), 
effectively transforming a more complex and error-prone internal operation into a less 
error-prone recognition task. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Distributed Cognitive Task: Norman & Zhang’s representation of Abstract Task 
Structure information and operations spread over internal and external structures. 
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Figure 4. From (Zhang, 1995) showing how six abstract necessary steps in multiplication 
are distributed between internal and external resources for three different numeric 
notation systems.  
 
 
 
Figure 4 above, taken from (Zhang, 1995) shows how six abstract necessary steps 
in multiplication are distributed between internal and external resources for three 
different numeric notation systems. Each combination of human user and numerical 
system notation is said to be isomorphic in the sense that the same six abstract tasks are 
being accomplished by the set of internal and external cognitive resources, but the 
choices of what is externally represented and what is internally represented in each case 
will have implications for how complex of a resultant task a human user must accomplish 
for the same abstract work to be accomplished. 
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Figure 5. From (Zhang, 1995); Arabic and Egyptian numerical notations compared using 
the distributed cognitive task representations. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 above, taken from (Zhang, 1995) shows how Arabic and Egyptian 
numerical notations differ in which of the four abstract numerical information elements 
are inherently represented externally as part of the numerical notation. Each combination 
of notation system and human user of the notation systems is said to be isomorphic in the 
sense that the same abstract numerical information is being represented across a set of 
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internal and external cognitive resources, the difference is in which are internally 
represented and which are represented externally. Again, the difference in distribution 
over internal and external cognitive resources will have implications for how complex of 
a resultant task a human user must accomplish for the same abstract work to be 
accomplished. 
Although Norman and Zhang make important distinctions between internal and 
external knowledge resources, their stance stills sits close to cognitivist views, in that 
external resources are considered resources for the “internal mind” (Zhang, 1997b), 
implying there is a choice in whether or not knowledge should be placed in the world or 
in the head. Zhang (p. 180) stresses “representational determinism,” as the role that 
external representations can play in cognitive processes; that differences in external 
representations of the same abstract task structure will differentially “guide, constrain, 
even determine cognitive behavior.” Zhang (p. 187) states that the External 
Representation framework (more general cognitive framework they name that includes 
Distributed Cognitive Tasks) is based on a key assumption that “denies the necessity of 
the internal model of external representations.” This can be clearly contrasted with 
stronger views on extended cognition (Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Clark, 2007), viewing 
use of external cognitive resources as a necessity (in many cases), rather than simply a 
convenient option. Norman and Zhang take the position that internal representations of 
external information is not necessary, if external representations are available, while 
Clark goes further, arguing that in many cases of cognition, internal representations are 
not only unnecessary, but would be either insufficient, or simply do not, and in some 
cases could not exist. As will be presented later in this chapter, Clark argues that much of 
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cognition is realized through the organization and use of ephemeral (or short-lived), 
“soft-assembled” extended cognitive systems made up of not only the intra-brain and 
extra-brain resources (the body and world), but that “loops” (Clark, 2007, p. 169) of 
information processing realized by these organizations should be considered first class 
cognitive systems. Relevant to this section (and as will be discussed further in the 
Conclusions and Future Research chapter) is that these “loops” are not represented in the 
Abstract Task Structure representations (and the External Representation framework in 
general) of Norman and Zhang, with only the internal and external constituents shown as 
binary choices, leaving out the interactions between them as part of the cognitive process. 
 
Distributed Intelligence 
 
Pea discusses distributed intelligence as the idea that through the use of external 
artifacts that have been imbued with intelligence, intelligence is accomplished rather than 
possessed (Pea, 1993). Pea takes issue with the concept of scaffolding as it has been 
recently used to represent too much of a percentage of external learning and activity aids. 
Pea argues that distributed intelligence is a more appropriate term for non-fading 
scaffolding (humans will always make use of the external aid) versus fading-scaffolding 
(learning and activity aids that will cease to be used once the desired skill or knowledge 
is learned) (Pea, 2004). 
Pea (1993, p. 53) states, “objects…have become so deeply a part of our 
consciousness that we do not notice them. Turned from history into nature, they are 
invisible, un-‘remarkable’ aspects of our experiential world.” “These tools literally carry 
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intelligence in them, in that they represent some individual’s or some community’s 
decision that the means thus offered should be reified, made stable, as a quasi-permanent 
form, for use by others.” 
This means that we need to keep questioning our assumptions about what role 
artifacts and the environment play in the process of cognition. Pea stresses that 
educational activities should focus more on making learners aware of the usefulness of 
imbuing intelligence into artifacts; i.e., educating learners in how to notice, construct, and 
evaluate such intelligent tools, rather than only focusing on the use of already existing 
tools. This in a sense is saying that methods such as the Distributed Cognitive 
Walkthrough (that aid us in noticing the intelligence, or lack of it, in the external world) 
should be used in the educational process of even young learners. 
 
Extended and Embodied Cognition 
 
Clark (1997) refers to distributed and extended cognition as an emergentist view 
of cognition, in that cognition can be viewed as an emergent phenomena that arises from 
the interaction of multiple cognitive resources (i.e., relevant here is the embodied 
interaction between external and internal cognitive resources). This emergentist view can 
be thought of as contrasting the more Cartesian, or reductionist flavor of cognition 
typically seen in characterizations of the cognitivist views of cognition. Moreover, these 
reductionist views are closely related to the foundational views of cognition that underlie 
existing usability evaluation techniques such as the Cognitive Walkthrough method. 
Clark (1997) proposes the use of tools and methods from dynamical systems theory and 
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complexity science (i.e., fields related to the study of emergence) for the study of 
cognition (when using an extended cognitive view). 
 
“Is gesture simply about the expression of fully-formed thoughts, and thus mainly 
a prop for inter-agent communication (listeners appreciating meanings through others’ 
gestures) or might gesture function as part of the actual process of thinking?” (Goldin-
Meadow, 2003, as cited by Clark, 2007, p. 176). As evidence towards gesture being 
thought of as part of the thought process itself, Clark (2007, p. 177) places emphasis on 
Goldin-Meadow’s example of how even blind persons use gesture, “It turns out, however 
that speakers blind from birth, who have never spoken to a visible listener, and never 
seen others moving their hands as they speak, gesture when they speak. Moreover, they 
do so even when speaking to others they know to be blind”. Clark builds a bridge from 
gesture as part of the cognitive process to a consideration of everyday resources such as 
paper as sometimes literally being part of the cognitive process: 
 “The act of gesturing, all this suggests, is not simply a motor act expressive of 
some fully neurally-realized process of thought. Instead, the physical act of gesturing is 
part and parcel of a coupled neural-bodily unfolding that is itself usefully seen as an 
organismically-extended process of thought.  In gesture we plausibly confront a cognitive 
process whose implementation involves machinery that loops out beyond the purely 
neural realm. This kind of cognitively pregnant unfolding need not stop at the boundary 
of the biological organism. Something very similar may, as frequently remarked, occur 
when we are busy writing and thinking at the same time. It is not always that fully formed 
thoughts get committed to paper. Rather, the paper provides a medium in which, this time 
via some kind of coupled neural-scribbling-reading unfolding, we are enabled to explore 
ways of thinking that might otherwise be unavailable to us. Just such a coupled unfolding 
was eloquently evoked in a famous exchange between Richard Feynman and the historian 
Charles Weiner: Weiner once remarked casually that [a batch of notes and sketches] 
represented ‘a record of [Feynman’s] day-to-day work,’ and Feynman reacted sharply. ‘I 
actually did the work on the paper,’ he said. ‘Well,’ Weiner said, ‘the work was done in 
your head, but the record of it is still here.’ ‘No, it’s not a record, not really. It’s working. 
You have to work on paper and this is the paper. Okay?’” (Clark, 2007, p. 179) 
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Clark (2007, p. 180) finishes this bridge between gestures as part of the thought 
process, to paper as a member of the thought process by saying that if the physical 
boundary between brain and hands should not be taken as a boundary for cognition, then 
“there seems no principled reason to suddenly stop the spread the moment skin meets 
air.” 
“The physical act of gesturing, Goldin-Meadow suggests, plays an active (not 
merely expressive) role in learning, reasoning, and cognitive change by providing an 
alternative (analog, motoric, visuo-spatial) representational format. In this way: 
‘Gesture…expands the set of representational tools available to speakers and listeners. It 
can redundantly reflect information represented through verbal formats or it can augment 
that information, adding nuances possible only through visual or motor formats.’ 
(Goldin-Meadow, 2003).” (Clark, 2007, p. 180) 
 
2.4 Organism Outsiders as Cognitive Insiders: How radical need we be? 
 
We will now highlight Clark’s discussion (Clark, 2007) of what he calls, 
Cognitive Hiccups to present the current, and lively debate in cognitive science over 
opposing views in just how radical a concept of cognition extending into the external 
world should be accepted. This shows that even beyond the initial cognitvist vs. post-
cognitivist argument, within even the post-cognitivist camps, there is much to be debated 
with respect to how integral external, environmental resources should be taken to be to 
cognitive processing. Use of the term cognitive hiccups, Clark says, is meant to represent 
the unproductive going back and forth between opposing (more and less radical) theories 
of extended and embedded cognition. This difference even within the post-cognitive 
camp is discussed here for literature review purposes, but is taken up again in the later 
chapters (the Discussion of Results, and the Conclusions and Future Research chapters) 
as it relates to applying the extended cognitive views in usability related practice. 
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Clark introduces the distinction made by others regarding two potential theories 
of extended cognition, differing in how radical a view each takes with respect to how 
tightly integrated external resources are to the process of cognition:  
“Human cognitive processing, according to the Extended Mind Hypothesis may at 
times extend into the environment surrounding the organism. Such a view should be 
contrasted with a nearby, (but much more conservative) view according to which certain 
cognitive processes lean heavily on environmental structures and scaffoldings, but do not 
thereby include those structures and scaffoldings themselves. This more conservative 
view may be claimed to capture all that can be of philosophical or scientific interest in 
such cases, and to avoid some significant dangers into the bargain. I shall argue, by 
contrast, that (in the relevant cases) it is the conservative view that threatens to obscure 
much that is of value, and that a robust notion of cognitive extension thus earns its keep 
as part of the emerging picture of the active embodied mind.” (Clark, 2007, p. 163) 
 
Rupert (Rupert, 2004, p. 389), quoted by Clark, defines the Hypothesis of 
Extended Cognition (HEC), saying, “According to this view…human cognitive 
processing literally extends into the environment surrounding the organism, and human 
cognitive states literally comprise – as wholes do their proper parts – elements in that 
environment.” (Rupert , 2004, p. 393) contrasts this more “radical” HEC hypothesis with 
what he calls the (more conservative) Hypothesis of Embedded Cognition (HEMC), by 
stating, as quoted by Clark, “Cognitive processes depend very heavily, in hitherto 
unexpected ways, on organismically external props and devices and on the structure of 
the external environment in which cognition takes place.” Clark places the blame for the 
fear of some to accept the more radical HEC, on two main misunderstandings in the 
presentation of the HEC view. 
The first issue (misunderstanding) stems from the obvious differences between 
inner and outer resources for cognition; for example, both neural networks and paper and 
pencil as memory resources. Clark says this stems from a misunderstanding of the Parity 
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Principle (see earlier in literature review), which should be taken more as stating that 
equal opportunity should be given to internal and external resources, not that both 
internal and external resources need to take similar structure. Here, (Clark, 2007, p. 167) 
quotes Michael Wheeler (Wheeler, in Press, p. 3), stating, “Wheeler notes that the wrong 
way to assess parity of contribution is: ‘to fix the benchmarks for what it is to count as a 
proper part of a cognitive system by identifying all the details of the causal contribution 
made by (say) the brain [then by looking] to see if any external elements meet those 
benchmarks.’” Instead, Clark states that the goal of the Parity Principle is to show that 
consideration of the contribution of a resource to the cognitive process should be done in 
an unbiased manner, with the most important bias in this case being where on the 
physical boundary between brain and world (and body!) a given resource may lie. 
 Clark, an obvious strong proponent of the stronger HEC view does give in a bit 
saying that although there may be in some cases no functional difference between roles 
played by external and internal resources, the human (brain) should still be seen as 
having a more special role overall in the cognitive process; he states that cognition can be 
said to be “organism-centered” (Clark, 2007). Even when giving in to the centrality of the 
human in the cognitive process, Clark does so still with a focus on the proper placement 
of external resources in cognition. Clark summarizes this with his Hypothesis of 
Organism-Centered Cognition (HOC): 
 “Human cognitive processing (sometimes) literally extends into the environment 
surrounding the organism. But the organism (and within the organism, the brain/CNS) 
remains the core and currently the most active element. Cognition is organism-centered 
even when it is not organism-bound.” (Clark, 2007, p. 192) 
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 We should therefore focus on use-centered evaluation and design (i.e., user-
centered, but not user-bound); e.g., not asking users, “how do you accomplish that?” 
expecting the user to be aware of it. 
Clark, states that Rupert’s position on the HEC (and the second main issue some 
have with the HEC) is that “it [the HEC] robs us, he fears, of the standard object of 
cognitive scientific theorizing viz the stable persisting human individual…will cause 
cognitive science and cognitive psychology to lose their grip on the very human subjects 
they aim to study. The price of HEC, if this were so, is nothing less than the loss of much 
(perhaps all) the progress that cognitive psychology has made thus far.” (Clark, 2007, p. 
166) 
 
2.4 Summary of the Distributed Cognitive Theories 
 
While (Zhang & Norman, 1994) do focus on the value of representing knowledge 
in the world, external to the human brain, their view does not address the complex, 
dynamic interactions that can occur between the internal and external representations. 
Norman & Zhang argue for a preference of knowledge in the world versus knowledge in 
the head (because internal memory is error prone), as though it is a binary choice. Other 
research concludes that the cognitive controller is indifferent to the choice between 
internal and external resources, and instead a utility function based on access time 
determines this decision in real world activity, at least for time periods of 50-300 
milliseconds (Gray & Boehm-Davis, 2000). Clark (Clark, 2007) argues for viewing the 
functional cognitive systems in real world activities as best viewed as ephemeral, soft-
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assembled loops, bringing together relevant internal and external resources. Moreover, 
Clark is careful to conclude that although such activity should not be viewed as 
“organism-bound,” it is “organism-centered,” reserving the intentionality in the system to 
internal cognitive resources. Both (Clark, 2007) and (Gray & Fu, 2004) use “soft” to 
qualify these cognitive properties that emerge in the interactions. Clark uses the term 
“soft-assembled” and Gray & Fu refer to “soft-constraints.” “Soft” is used in both cases 
to refer to this idea that the organism-unbound cognitive systems and properties can in 
most cases be overridden by the “harder” constraints that are tied more centrally to 
internal cognitive resources (the brain and central nervous system). 
These concepts are not inherent to only human activity. Darwinian evolution has 
resulted in many solutions that make use of resources biologically external to an 
organism that can be considered functionally connected in a soft-assembly of resources; 
these external (and in many cases, artificial, animal-built) resources can be thought of as 
part of the functional physiology of the biological organism (Turner, 2000). 
 Pea (1993) offers insight into the invisibility that builds over time, as artifacts 
become more a part of our daily lives, with the usefulness of these artifacts becoming 
attributed to the user, rather than to the artifact. This evolution of the attribution of 
usefulness from the artifact to the user highlights one of the major difficulties in carrying 
out design and evaluation in the real world; how do we notice these contributions that 
have become so invisible? 
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Unification of the Distributed Cognitive theories 
 
Major concepts of each of the previously presented contributing theories of 
distributed and extended cognition are listed below, followed by a list unifying these 
theories. This unified list of distributed cognitive concepts will serve useful later, 
especially for discussions regarding the mapping of these main points to the Distributed 
Cognitive Walkthrough developed for use in experimental comparison to the Cognitive 
Walkthrough method. 
 
Distributed Cognition (Hutchins) 
• Distribution and propagation of representational state across internal (human 
brain) and external representational media. 
• Transformational properties of representational media. 
• Distribution of representational state across time. 
• Distribution of representational state across people. 
• Distribution of representational state across space. 
• Cultural and Social aspects of cognition. 
• Evolution of artifacts over time. 
 
Distributed Cognitive Tasks (Norman & Zhang) 
• Internal versus internal representation of information (knowledge in the world). 
• External representations of procedural knowledge. 
• Constraints in the external world used to embody knowledge necessary for a task. 
• Constraints in the external world define the task that is to be accomplished.  
• Invisibility of usable things. 
 
Distributed Intelligence (Pea) 
• Intelligence is accomplished rather than possessed. 
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• Distributed, intelligent tools evolved over time move “from history to nature,” 
resulting in tools whose embedded intelligence becomes invisible, leading to the 
attribution of intelligence to the human user of such tools. 
• Rethinking of educational process and system, with increased focus on educating 
learners to notice (the “invisible” intelligence), construct, and evaluate distributed, 
intelligent tools. 
 
Extended Cognition, Emergentist view of cognition (Clark) 
• Cognition emerges in the embodied interaction between humans and the world. 
• Dynamic systems analysis tools can be used in cognitive science to understand 
cognition and behavior. 
• “The mind was never in the head to begin with.” Cognitivist views of cognition 
incorrectly placed it there. 
• Gestures and everyday resources are part of ‘soft-assembled’ information 
processing cognitive loops. 
 
Unified set of Distributed Cognitive concepts, integrating the above four lists 
• Distribution across internal and external representational media. 
• Transformational properties of representational media. 
• Distribution of cognition over time. 
• Distribution of cognition across people. 
• Distribution of cognition over space. 
• Emergentist view of cognition. 
• Accomplishment of cognition, as opposed to static possession. 
• Cultural and social embedding of cognition. 
• Evolution of the distribution, and artifact embodiment of cognition over time. 
• Gestures and everyday resources are part of ‘soft-assembled’ information 
processing cognitive loops. 
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2.5 Previous Research Applying Related Post-Cognitivist Theories to Usability 
Evaluation and Design Methods 
 
The application of theories of distributed and extended cognition (and related 
post-cognitivist theories) for design and evaluation of useful and usable artifacts, 
products, and services has primarily been carried out by researchers and practitioners 
with much time and education invested in these theories (Hutchins, 1995; Zhang & 
Norman, 1994; Zhang, 1997a; Zhang, 1997b; Wright, et al., 1996; Bertelsen, 2004; 
Kaptelinin & Nardi, 2006). The majority of uses of distributed cognitive principles in 
system design and evaluation more closely resemble ethnographic studies (Hutchins, 
1995b) than the type of evaluation typically carried out by interaction design and 
usability practitioners (e.g., Cognitive Walkthrough or Heuristic Evaluation) (Rogers, 
1997). Moreover, these applications of distributed cognitive theories therefore require 
time and education requirements that are cost, time, and resource prohibitive with typical 
practitioner resources (Rogers, 1997). 
 
Distributed and Extended Cognition based methods 
 
The Information Resources Model (Wright, et al., 1996), a model of HCI related 
interaction based on Distributed Cognition “identifies a number of interaction strategies” 
and discusses how different “information structures can be used as resources for action.” 
Although the literature (Wright, et al., 1996) for this model provides examples of 
application of Distributed Cognition to design and evaluation related to HCI, there is no 
representation of this model as a method to be used by theory-novice or evaluation-
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novice practitioners; it should only be taken as a proof of concept that Distributed 
Cognition concepts can be used for the design and evaluation related to HCI (by 
researchers educated in and dedicated to Distributed Cognition). 
Rather than more theory for interaction design and evaluation, which may only 
result in practitioners becoming only more theory weary (Erickson, 2000), our research 
focuses on the development and evaluation of a practical usability design and evaluation 
method based on the principles of existing, already well-argued theories (in this case, 
distributed and extended cognitive theory). Similar attempts have been made to develop 
walkthrough-style evaluation methods for theories that share at least one aspect with 
distributed cognitive theories. These methods include the Activity Walkthrough 
(Bertelsen, 2004), based on Activity Theory, and the Cognitive Dimensions usability 
assessment method (Green, 1989). Another related method is the Programming 
Walkthrough (Bell et al., 1994), originally designed to evaluate programming languages 
and environments based on the idea of guiding knowledge required to carry out tasks and 
actions to accomplish goals. The Programming Walkthrough was also extended to be 
used for applications such as the evaluation of educational activities and environments 
(Lewis et al., 1998). 
 
Activity Theory based methods 
 
 Theoretical frameworks such as Distributed Cognition, Extended Cognition, and 
Activity Theory could be characterized as theoretical moving targets more so than static 
theories, making them very difficult compare. Both Activity Theory and many of the 
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theories of distributed and extended cognition tend to differ in definition, depending on 
the source, or time period, which is why sometimes they are both referred to as 
theoretical frameworks as opposed to theories. The below discussion points out a couple 
of the differences between the distributed and extended cognitive theories when 
compared to Activity Theory that have been consistent over time. 
 Activity theorists sometimes lump together distributed cognition with Actor-
Network Theory (ANT), claiming that distributed cognition gives agency and 
intentionality to non-human resources in the same homogeneous manner as ANT 
(Kaptelinin & Nardi, 2006). Where Activity Theory and distributed and extended 
cognitive theories differ the most is the centrality of individual human goals and 
intentions. For example, Activity Theory tends to focus on activities that are conscious to 
an individual actor, even when noting that the individual is taking part in a community 
process. This focus on the individual as the unit of cognition is interesting given how 
integral Vygotsky’s ideas on inter-psychological (external knowing) leading to intra-
psychological knowing are to the development of Activity Theory. This focus on 
individual consciousness leads to Activity Theory considering the individual human as 
the unit of analysis with respect to cognition. Tied to this difference between the two sets 
of theories, a difference in the role of external tools and artifacts becomes clear. While 
distributed and extended cognitive theories include external artifacts as first class parts of 
a soft-assembled cognitive system, Activity Theory focuses on external artifacts as tools 
“for” cognition. 
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Groups (as users) based methods 
 
The Groupware Walkthrough (Pinelle & Gutwin, 2002) is an attempt at bringing 
notions of context and collaboration into a walkthrough-style usability evaluation 
method. The Groupware Walkthrough asks questions directly at the experience 
(emergent) system level, rather than at a lower (causal) level where design changes are 
possible (such as in the DCW and CW methods). Although the proposed DCW method is 
as well concerned with emergentist levels of cognition and usability, the Groupware 
Walkthrough asks the questions directly at this emergent, resultant system level, where 
although the emergent system properties may be visible, the constituent causal 
contributors to these properties are not questioned. One goal of the DCW method is to 
ask questions about these lower level constituent contributors; i.e., focusing on how well 
evaluated artifact helps foster usability, not whether or not usability is present. 
 It is unclear from the literature how useful the Groupware Walkthrough method 
may be to practitioners. The authors start with praising the value of discount methods 
(i.e., don't need users; use on low fidelity design representations), of which the groupware 
method is to be considered (implied from their discussion). The authors then propose that 
use of the Groupware Walkthrough start with observations of real users in real contexts. 
This makes it unclear if the method is to be taken as possibly useful as a low-cost 
walkthrough method.  As is the case with the other methods based on theories related to 
distributed and extended cognition discussed earlier, the authors state the method is 
useful, but only the authors use the method in the single case study. It is not clear how 
useful the method would be when used by those other than who thought it up. In addition 
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to only reporting use of the new method by only the authors, there is no comparison to 
any other methods (especially the Cognitive Walkthrough) for even the single case study 
example they provide. The lack of comparison to the Cognitive Walkthrough method is 
noteworthy given the points that the authors raise regarding how the Cognitive 
Walkthrough method does not apply well to analysis of groupware. A major drawback 
related to our current research is that the actual point in use of the Groupware method 
where potential usability issues would be determined by evaluators is very subjective. 
This is a key reason why without experimental use of the method by evaluators other than 
the authors, it is very unclear what contribution such a method is providing to usability 
related evaluation and design. 
 
2.6 The Role of Materiality of artifacts 
 
 It is well known (Buxton, 2007) that the materiality and fidelity of a prototype can 
impact evaluation. For example a working piece of software may invite fewer critiques, 
especially more minor comments than a paper prototype because there may be an 
assumption that if the prototype is already realized in software, it’s too late to nitpick 
over little issues, while a paper prototype may not act as such a barrier to comments. 
 The impact of prototype fidelity and materiality is relevant regardless of the 
intended materiality of the final production version of an artifact or system. What is less 
known, and has not been explored in the literature is what impact differences in intended 
materiality (known at design time) of the final version of an artifact or system may have 
on the evaluation. For example, designers may be able to choose between digital and 
paper solutions for various aspects of an artifact. The research related to fidelity and 
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materiality of prototypes does not address this relationship between the materiality of the 
final version of an artifact and how this may effect evaluation of both prototypes and 
finished production versions. 
2.7 Summary of the problems related to usability evaluation and related research 
questions 
 
Distributed and extended cognition theories simply are not represented in 
practical usability evaluation and design methods. The methods mentioned above 
(Bertelsen, 2004; Green, 1989; Wright, et al., 1996) that do attempt to bridge post-
cognitivist theory with practice are either too esoteric except only to theoretical insiders 
(Kaptelinin & Nardi, 2006) or require prohibitive time and resource commitments to be 
practically useful. Moreover, such methods have typically only been employed by those 
who created them, and no comparative use studies exists in the literature that would allow 
practitioners to decide if the method would be of use. We do not believe the solution is a 
matter of informing practitioners about distributed cognitive theories with an expectation 
that distributed cognitive theories will then be considered in practice. Many practitioners 
who employ the Cognitive Walkthrough method are not aware of the underlying theory 
(CE+ exploratory learning theory (Reiman, et al., 1995)) of the method, but they use the 
method nonetheless (with confidence in the method’s efficacy related to finding usability 
issues). Therefore, we believe a good approach for promoting the distributed cognitive 
view in real world practice is to learn from the success of the Cognitive Walkthrough 
method, and develop a practical, easy to use method based on theories of distributed 
cognition. 
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The DCW method introduced in this current research will therefore serve two 
primary objectives; 1) embodiment of principles of distributed and extended cognitive 
theory, while also 2) being practically useful in generating actionable information 
regarding potential usability issues. 
Most existing usability evaluation methods are based on cognitivist theories (e.g., 
Information Processing and Symbol-Systems Model views of cognitive science) (e.g., 
Reiman, et al., 1995). Usability findings discovered using such methods therefore tend to 
rely on assumptions that users carry around internal mental models of expected artifact 
operation, rather than viewing the artifact as embodying some of the knowledge or 
information that makes up a (distributed) mental model.  
Previous work in usability design and evaluation that leverages ideas from 
distributed cognitive theory is done in the style and timing of cultural or cognitive 
ethnographic research. The current research can therefore serve as a complement to this 
previous and ongoing research by providing both evaluation methods that can be used on 
shorter time scales, and by providing methods that may be more useful for design and 
evaluation of future, to-be artifacts (as opposed to the focus on existing historical 
artifacts). 
Related work in bringing a stronger consideration of the context of use into 
usability evaluation focuses on context as situating cognition, while our research takes a 
different perspective, focusing instead on context actually taking part in the distributed 
process of accomplishing cognition; i.e., the context can be cognitive. 
Theoretical frameworks such as Distributed Cognition (as with most cognitive 
frameworks) require more than a reasonably practical educational background for novices 
  
 
   
          
 
 
  
  34   
in usability and design fields. Therefore, taking a distributed cognitive perspective on 
educating these practitioners, this research focuses on putting relevant knowledge 
(relevant to usability) related to theories of distributed cognition in the method instrument 
itself. 
For a method (especially a walkthrough style method) to be broadly applicable to 
an increasingly large number of artifacts and systems some intended ambiguity is to be 
expected; hence the transformation over time of the Cognitive Walkthrough method from 
questions language specific to interfaces, to questions more appropriate for non-GUI 
systems. 
Designing useful and usable artifacts and systems is difficult (Myers, 1993), and 
no individual new theory, or new method based on existing theory should ever be 
expected to serve as a silver bullet.  We do not expect distributed cognitive theory to 
somehow offer a magic, or silver bullet solution to finding usable solutions, instead the 
goal is to use the distributed cognitive theories, and the related representations presented 
above to aid designers and evaluators in being aware of design choices, and their 
implications in ways that other theoretical groundings may not offer. 
The way that people interact with the real world in everyday activities (i.e., how 
internal and external resources are employed in a coordinative manner) in order to 
accomplish cognitive acts must be represented in how artifacts and services are designed. 
If inter-brain resources, such as subtle gestures and everyday uses of paper are part of the 
thought process (which we know from the literature), not simply representations of 
results of prior thought that occurs in the brain (Goldin-Meadow, 2003, Clark, 2007), 
then it would be a mistake to ignore the importance of these everyday cognitive resources 
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in interaction design and evaluation. Similarly, it is important to address the fact that 
action can be both epistemic and pragmatic (Kirsh & Maglio 1994) in our design and 
evaluation methods, given the overarching goal shared by all who claim to strive for 
usability, of trying to design artifacts and systems in a manner that reflect and respect the 
cognitive process of humans (even if some of this process is not inside the human brain). 
 
Figure 6. Graphical overview of motivation for this research. Cognitivist theories are well 
represented in practical methods, while distributed and extended cognitive views are not 
represented. Methods based on distributed and extended theories have unfortunately only 
been used by the researchers who developed the methods. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
 
3.1 Research Objectives 
 
The primary objective of the our research is the comparison of the application of 
cognitivist and post-cognitivist theories in usability evaluation and design through the 
development and experimental evaluation of a practical walkthrough-style method for 
finding potential usability issues grounded in distributed cognitive theories; Distributed 
Cognition (Hutchins, 1995a), Distributed Cognitive Task (Zhang & Norman, 1994), 
Distributed Intelligence (Pea, 1993), and Embodied Cognition (Clark, 1997). Practical is 
used here to mean a method that can be used by typical Human Computer Interaction 
(HCI), interaction design, and usability practitioners to evaluate designs represented at 
many levels of fidelity, resulting in actionable potential usability issues. The developed 
method will hopefully increase awareness of potential usability problems across many of 
the interactions between (distributed) cognitive system components (people, artifacts, and 
information). 
A secondary objective of the dissertation is the discussion of how constituent 
ideas in distributed cognitive theories relate to usability and interaction design and 
evaluation. The developed method would ideally embody all relevant distributed 
cognition theories at a level of abstraction appropriate for practical interaction design and 
evaluation. The process of deciding if and how an idea from distributed cognitive theory 
can be presented as part of a practical walkthrough-style method will make visible 
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potential contributions to interaction design and usability of each of these specific 
distributed cognitive ideas. 
 
3.2 High Level Research Questions 
 
1. How do usability evaluations conducted using a walkthrough usability evaluation 
method based on theories of distributed cognition relate to the use of evaluations 
conducted using existing interaction design and usability walkthrough evaluation 
methods based on more cognitivist principles? 
 
2. How does the evaluation of usability differ for scenarios involving individual versus 
multiple users of information represented in the evaluated artifact? 
(i.e., How do evaluators consider externalization of cognition for a person interacting 
with him or herself over time versus two people interacting over time?) 
 
3. How does the intended final materiality of the artifact or system being evaluated 
impact evaluation? 
(Are evaluators more likely to place certain expectations on digital technology? E.g., can 
digital technology more easily be seen as "intelligent," compared to the role of 
paper/pencils? Will evaluators, e.g., be more likely to blame digital technology (i.e., call 
out the digital technology in a finding) than non-digital resources?) 
 
3.3 Specific Research Questions To Be Addressed 
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RQ 1 Reported severity by method and number-of-users 
 
RQ 1.1: Is there a difference in average usability severity ratings by walkthrough 
evaluation method? 
HYP 1.1: There is a difference in average usability severity ratings by walkthrough 
evaluation method. 
 
RQ 1.2: Is there a difference in average usability severity ratings by number-of-users? 
HYP 1.2: There is a difference in average usability severity ratings by number-of-users. 
 
 
RQ 2 Actionability by method and number-of-users 
 
RQ 2.1: Is there a difference in actionability ratings by walkthrough evaluation method? 
HYP 2.1: There is a difference in actionability ratings by walkthrough evaluation method. 
 
RQ 2.2: Is there a difference in average usability severity ratings by number-of-users? 
HYP 2.2: There is a difference in average usability severity ratings by number-of-users. 
 
 
RQ 3 Usability relevance by method and number-of-users 
 
RQ 3.1: Is there a difference in usability relevance by walkthrough evaluation method? 
HYP 3.1: There is a difference in usability relevance by walkthrough evaluation method. 
 
RQ 3.2: Is there a difference in usability relevance by number-of-users? 
HYP 3.2: There is a difference in usability relevance by number-of-users. 
 
 
RQ4 Attribution of responsibility of cognitive activity by method and number-of-
users 
 
RQ 4.1: Is there a difference in attribution of responsibility of cognitive activity by 
walkthrough evaluation method? 
HYP 4.1: There is a difference in attribution of responsibility of cognitive activity by 
walkthrough evaluation method. 
 
RQ 4.2: Is there a difference in attribution of responsibility of cognitive activity by 
number-of-users? 
HYP 4.2: There is a difference in attribution of responsibility of cognitive activity by 
number-of-users. 
 
RQ 5 Subjective perception of method (understandability and usefulness) by 
method and number-of-users 
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RQ 5.1: Is there a difference in subjective perception of understandability of the method 
by walkthrough evaluation method? 
HYP 5.1: There is a difference in subjective perception of understandability of the 
method by walkthrough evaluation method. 
 
RQ 5.2: Is there a difference in subjective perception of understandability of the method 
by number-of-users? 
HYP 5.2: There is a difference subjective perception of understandability of the method 
by number-of-users. 
 
RQ 5.3: Is there a difference in subjective perception of usefulness of the method by 
walkthrough evaluation method? 
HYP 5.3: There is a difference in subjective perception of usefulness of the method by 
walkthrough evaluation method. 
 
RQ 5.4: Is there a difference in subjective perception of usefulness of the method by 
number-of-users? 
HYP 5.4: There is a difference subjective perception of usefulness of the method by 
number-of-users. 
 
 
RQ 6 Reported severity by materiality 
 
RQ 6.1: Is there a difference in average usability severity ratings by materiality? 
HYP 6.1: There is a difference in average usability severity ratings by materiality. 
 
 
RQ 7 Actionability by materiality 
 
RQ 7.1: Is there a difference in actionability ratings by materiality? 
HYP 7.1: There is a difference in actionability ratings by materiality. 
 
RQ 8 Usability relevance by materiality 
 
RQ 8.1: Is there a difference in usability relevance by materiality? 
HYP 8.1: There is a difference in usability relevance by materiality. 
 
RQ 9 Attribution of responsibility of cognitive activity by materiality 
 
RQ 9.1: Is there a difference in attribution of responsibility of cognitive activity by 
materiality? 
HYP 9.1: There is a difference in attribution of responsibility of cognitive activity by 
materiality. 
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RQ 10 Subjective perception of method (understandability and usefulness) by 
materiality 
 
RQ 10.1: Is there a difference in subjective perception of understandability of the method 
by materiality? 
HYP 10.1: There is a difference in subjective perception of understandability of the 
method by materiality. 
 
RQ 10.2: Is there a difference in subjective perception of usefulness of the method by 
materiality? 
HYP 10.2: There is a difference in subjective perception of usefulness of the method by 
materiality. 
 
 
Our research is focused on the nature of the discussion of usability findings. 
Rather than differences in the number and types of issues reported (as with most 
comparative UEM research), we are interested in the qualitative nature of how usability 
issues and non-issues are reported by participants for a given finding. For example, we 
would expect to see a post-cognitive-inspired method (i.e., Distributed Cognitive 
Walkthrough) result in more positive reference to the external cognitive resources 
afforded by an artifact or system. Likewise, we would expect use of a cognitivist-inspired 
method (Cognitive Walkthrough) to result in greater attribution to the internal cognitive 
resources of a single human user. 
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CHAPTER 4: DISTRIBUTED COGNITIVE WALKTHROUGH 
 
4.1 Distributed Cognitive Walkthrough (DCW) method overview 
 
A walkthrough-style usability evaluation method, the Distributed Cognitive 
Walkthrough (DCW) method based on theories of distributed cognition, Distributed 
Cognition (Hutchins, 1995a; Hollan el al., 2002; Rogers, 1997), Distributed Cognitive 
Tasks (Zhang & Norman, 1994), Distributed Intelligence (Pea, 1993; Pea 2004), and 
Extended Cognition (Clark & Chalmers, 1998), has been iteratively developed and pilot 
testing has been conducted. The development of the DCW method included consideration 
of data that the author collected during use of the original Cognitive Walkthrough method 
while teaching HCI I and HCI II undergraduate courses at IST; this data is relevant in that 
the students who took these courses are representative of the population that will be 
sampled for the proposed research. 
While the original Cognitive Walkthrough method can be seen as evaluating the 
learnability of an artifact with respect to learning from a cognitivist perspective, the 
Distributed Cognitive Walkthrough can be seen as evaluating learnability from a 
distributed cognitive perspective; i.e., the extended cognitive system can be considered as 
learning through the use of external (and internal) cognitive resources in a manner 
analogous to how cognitivist theories view learning through the use of internal cognitive 
resources of an individual person. 
Iterative development of the DCW method focused on how to use a simple four 
question walkthrough method to represent the wealth of concepts that can be found in 
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distributed cognitive theories. The unified list of concepts that was first introduced in 
Section 1.1 above is presented again below, showing the concepts the DCW was intended 
to address (related to usability in interaction design and HCI). 
 
• Distribution across internal and external representational media. 
• Transformational properties of representational media. 
• Distribution of cognition over time. 
• Distribution of cognition across people. 
• Distribution cognition over space. 
• View of cognition as an emergent phenomena resulting from the interaction of 
cognitive resources. 
• Accomplishment of cognition, as opposed to static possession. 
• Cultural and social embedding of cognition. 
• Evolution of the distribution of cognition over time. 
 
The remainder of this DCW method overview section highlights which specific 
aspects of the distributed cognitive theories being considered relate to each DCW method 
question, and how the questions work together to embody more complex, emergent 
(Clark, 1997) aspects of the theories that are difficult to represent in a single question. 
Similar to the use of the Cognitive Walkthrough method (Polson et al., 1992; Sharp, et 
al., 2002), the questions are phrased in a manner such that each answer of “No” to any of 
the DCW method’s four questions should indicate a potential usability issue. 
The current version of the method includes the use of a severity rating for each 
usability issue, using Jakob Nielsen’s scale from 0 (no usability issue) to 4 (catastrophic 
usability issue). The severity rating scale presented below is shown next to each DCW 
method question, and the user of the method is directed to choose an appropriate severity 
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when the question is answered with a “No.” The current DCW worksheet (provided in 
later section on experimental materials) to be used by participants provides the following 
severity rating list for each potential usability issue found by each of the four questions: 
 
0 = No usability issue at all  
1 = Cosmetic problem only 
2 = Minor usability problem  
3 = Major usability problem  
4 = Usability catastrophe 
 
 
 
 
DCW Question 1 
 
Will the way that information is represented externally show relevant previous 
progress by the current or other users towards accomplishing the task? 
 
The first DCW question relates to all three of Hutchins’ principles (Hutchins, 
1995) as well as Norman and Zhang’s idea of distributed cognitive task state (Zhang & 
Norman, 1994) in that the intent of this question is to get at how well external 
representations of knowledge and information provide the current state of the work being 
accomplished. This is very important in situations where either many people work 
together in a distributed manner (in time, space, etc), or in cases where an individual 
cannot keep track of work accomplished (interaction with yourself through the 
environment, over time and space). 
 
 
DCW Question 2 
 
Will the way that information is represented externally provide all knowledge 
required to carry out the task? 
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The second DCW question relates mostly to the second principle given by 
Hutchins (cognitive processes may involve coordination between internal and external 
structure) (Hutchins, 1995); this principle is closely related to the idea of knowledge in 
the world versus knowledge in the head (Norman, 1990; Norman, 1993; Zhang & 
Norman, 1994; Zhang, 1997b). Hutchins’ third principle is relevant to this question as 
well, in that earlier cognitive work done, regardless of who or what accomplished the 
work, should be available across time and space to be useful for other tasks and contexts. 
 
 
DCW Question 3 
 
Will the way that information is represented externally provide resources that 
relieve the user from having to figure out or calculate anything in his or her head 
while carrying out the task? 
 
The third DCW question relates to Hutchins’ second principle (cognitive 
processes may involve coordination between internal and external structure) (Hutchins, 
1995) and Norman and Zhang’s ideas on external representation of operation knowledge 
in the world (Norman, 1990; Norman, 1993; Zhang & Norman, 1994; Zhang, 1997b). 
The intent of this third question is related to the second DCW question, but differs in that 
the second question focuses on the required knowledge and information for a task being 
available externally, whereas this third question has the intent of asking more about how 
well the available information representation maps to the formalization of information 
that is needed to carry out the task; i.e., if the formalization of external representation of 
knowledge and information differs from what would be usable for a given task context, 
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the user will have to carry out a transformation, possibly being forced to use limited and 
error-prone internal cognitive resources. 
 
DCW Question 4 
 
If the current task is accomplished, will the way that information is represented 
externally show the result of the task in a way that is accessible by the current or 
other users at a later time or a different place? 
 
The fourth DCW question is really a culmination of all three of Hutchins’ 
principles (cognitive processes may be distributed across the members of a social group, 
processes may be distributed through time in such a way that the products of earlier 
events can transform the nature of later events, and cognitive processes may involve 
coordination between internal and external structure) (Hutchins, 1995). Going beyond 
what the original cognitive walkthrough asks about feedback visibility in the instant a 
change occurs, the distributed cognitive take on feedback here is that changes in the 
system should be accessible to all relevant stakeholders who may later need this 
information. Similar to the case for the third question above, this is just as relevant for 
work being accomplished by individuals collaborating with him or herself over time, as it 
is more obviously across groups of people interacting over dimensions such as space and 
time. 
 
 
4.2 Summary of intent of questions: Fostering Distributed Cognition 
 
Similar to the idea that you cannot really design learning, that you can only design 
elements that foster it (Wenger, 1999), it is important to realize that interaction designers 
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cannot fully design experiences, or interaction, designers can only attempt to design 
artifacts and spaces that foster it. Likewise, methods that evaluate such design work must 
take this idea into account, seeing experiences and interactions as occurring over time, 
space, and social structures. Therefore, the overall goal of the Distributed Cognitive 
Walkthrough method is to evaluate how well a design participates in fostering good 
usability as an emergent property of a distributed cognitive system (Hutchins, 1995; 
Clark, 1997) in a concrete context of use. 
Artifacts “become so deeply a part of our consciousness that we do not notice 
them. Turned from history into nature, they are invisible, un-‘remarkable’ aspects of our 
experiential world” (Pea, 1993, p. 53). This means that we (designers and evaluators) 
need to proactively question our assumptions about what role artifacts and the 
environment currently do, and could play in the process of cognition. 
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Chapter 5: SCENARIO FOR EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 
 
 
This chapter serves two main purposes. First, the real world scenario of coffee 
shops is introduced, as this forms the basis of the scenarios that were used in the 
experimental comparisons. The specific experimental scenarios can be found in the last 
section of the following research methods chapter. The second purpose of this chapter is 
to show how different views of cognition (cognitivist, and the main distributed and 
extended cognitive views introduced in the literature review chapter) can be used to view 
the seemingly simple activity of making drinks in a coffee shop.  The ability to 
differentially represent the same activity with differing views of cognition then enables a 
brief discussion on how these differing views of cognition can enable differing 
evaluations of the same activity. 
 
5.1 How a Coffee Shop Remembers its Orders 
(Spin off of Hutchins’ How a Cockpit Remembers its Speeds) 
 
The experiments that were conducted for this research involved scenarios taken 
from the domain of coffee shops, where many different complicated drink orders must be 
taken by workers from customers, and these drink orders must be tracked until the drinks 
can be made and given to the customer. Figure 7 below shows a coffee cup (based on 
what is used at a popular Seattle-based coffee shop chain) that has six boxes on the cup 
where workers can write directly on the cup to represent a specific drink that a customer 
ordered. The coffee shop workers may in fact rely strongly on long-term internal memory 
for the defaults of all of the drinks that can be ordered, but the interesting point is that the 
variations on these defaults are marked up in the six boxes on the cup. Therefore, much 
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of the specific drink information is represented externally, relieving the worker from 
having to use more error-prone internal cognitive resources; moreover, the size of the 
physical cup itself represents the size of the drink ordered, serving as a good example of 
how information can be represented in inherent physical constraints of physical artifacts. 
The cup does not need a box for drink size, because this information is inherently 
represented in the physical size of the cup). Many other popular (i.e., busy) coffee shops 
do not use such externalization of drink order information, potentially resulting in a 
higher rate of drink errors, and in many cases requiring customers to take part in the 
tracking of whether or not the correct drink is being made as ordered. 
  
Figure 7. Coffee cup (based on what is used at a popular Seattle-based chain) showing 
boxes that workers mark up to represent different drinks. This allows the workers to 
handle more concurrent drink orders than would be possible to keep track of using only 
internal cognitive resources. 
 
Figure 8 below shows a cheat sheet used by grill cooks in a restaurant chain that 
is used in a manner similar to the example of the above coffee cup. The cheat sheet shows 
how grill cooks use different configurations of food condiments placed directly on the 
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actual plates that will be served to customers to represent large numbers of complicated, 
yet similar food orders (while the orders are still cooking on the grill). These 
configurations allow the grill cook to be working on more concurrent orders than would 
be possible to track using only internal cognitive resources. The plate itself represents 
information such as the size or type (e.g., eggs, steak) of the order, making use of real 
world inherent physical constraints to represent information, in the same way that the 
coffee cup in Figure 7 itself represents the size of the drink ordered. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Grill cook cheat sheet. Different configurations of condiments placed on plates 
represent specific food orders. These configurations allow the grill cook to be working on 
more concurrent orders than would be possible to keep track of using only internal 
cognitive resources. 
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 Selection of the coffee shop task scenario for our research was not trivial. 
Similarity in activity complexity between a drive-thru coffee shop (which is easily 
accessible to study) and many environments that are difficult to get access to, but that are 
usually thought of as more complex (e.g., airplane cockpits) was an important factor; the 
ultimate choice of the coffee shop scenario was because of the good mix of the above 
stated complexity and accessibility, and because participants would likely be equally 
experienced in the domain of everyday coffee shops. 
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Chapter 6: RESEARCH METHOD 
 
This chapter discusses the research experiments in terms of what participants did, 
what and how data was collected and the planned data analysis. The remainder of this 
introduction section additionally provides a brief discussion of how the research design 
has been influenced and guided by the many “damaged merchandise” papers (Gray & 
Salzman, 1998) and discussions regarding what should be considered when conducting 
research related to the comparison of usability evaluation methods. The Experiment 
Design section provides an overview of the research design with high-level introductions 
of the three between-subject independent variables that were used in the two 
experimental comparisons (Experiment 1 and Experiment 2). In addition, the main 
dependent variables that were collected and analyzed are introduced and rationale for use 
is discussed. The Experiment Data section provides more detailed descriptions of the 
data, including how the data was collected, who rated the data (participant, 2 expert 
judges), and planned analysis methods. Hypotheses related to the research questions 
being addressed by our research can be found in the previous Research Objectives and 
Questions chapter. Finally, the Experimental Materials section provides the experimental 
materials that were given to participants, including a representation of the design to be 
evaluated, task scenarios that describe what the design being evaluated is intended to help 
a user accomplish, the experimental-group-specific method (i.e., CW or DCW methods) 
materials to be used for carrying out the evaluations, and pre-task and post-task 
questionnaires that were used by participants (e.g., participant experience, and how 
understandable and useful did participants perceive the methods to be). 
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6.1 Damaged Merchandise Influence on Research Design and Goals 
 
The experiment design, data collection, and analysis are greatly influenced by 
previous research related to comparing usability evaluation methods (UEMs), e.g., 
(Jeffries et al., 1991). In addition, great consideration was given to the issues discussed in 
the Damaged Merchandise papers and CHI conference panel (Gray & Salzman, 1998) 
that addressed numerous issues related to validity and realistic expectations of research 
that compares UEMs. The main areas of concern for conducting research comparing 
UEMs taken from the initial damaged merchandise paper are listed below with both a 
brief description of each issue as it applies specifically to experimental research for 
comparing UEMs, and how the research design mitigates each specific issue. 
Statistical Conclusion Validity deals with issues of conducting experimental 
research that has low statistical power, improper or nonexistent use of statistical analysis 
methods, or the use of statistical analysis methods that do not account for individual 
differences between participants (the Wildcard effect) (Gray & Salzman, 1998). Low 
statistical power can result from using sample sizes too small relative to the inherent 
effect size of the phenomena being studied. In some cases, statistical validity issues 
involve use of a large number of unplanned data comparisons, with the hopes of finding 
something significant (Gray & Salzman, 1998). Lastly, statistical validity may involve 
not using statistical methods that will properly take into account the wildcard effect (Gray 
& Salzman, 1998), which basically means that in some cases the variability in 
experimental data may be due more to the variability in individual participants (e.g., skill, 
experience) than being due to differences caused by the experimental intervention. 
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In order to try to mitigate such statistical validity issues, planning for the proposed 
research included pilot testing, with subsequent statistical power analysis in order to 
better understand the statistical power of this research. Power analysis of pilot testing 
data indicated a medium effect size seen in the pilot study data for the planned 
comparisons.  
Internal Validity issues are related to the selection of participants, variability in 
experiment setting, and instrumentation bias (Gray & Salzman, 1998). Beyond the more 
obvious issue of differences between participants (which cannot be as easily controlled 
for) issues arise when experimental settings or differ between experiments (which can be 
more easily controlled for). Finally, instrumentation issues are related to method bias, for 
example when those judging the results of UEM evaluations know which evaluations 
come from which method. To avoid such issues, our research included the use of 
participants with consistent usability experience (the same HCI course from the same 
academic program), and a consistent experimental setting. 
 
Construct Validity deals with the question “are the experimenters manipulating 
what they claim to be manipulating (the causal construct) and are they measuring what 
they claim to be measuring (the effect construct)?” (Gray & Salzman, 1998). The causal 
construct  concept deals with whether or not the versions of the UEMs being studied 
match with the commonly held view of the methods; this becomes an issue over time in 
the case where a UEM may keep the same name while changing how it is carried out 
(i.e., after the earlier version of the method is used in published research). Effect 
construct issues arise when usability findings from fundamentally differing UEMs are 
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compared, for example comparing findings from usability testing with users to findings 
from a heuristic evaluation. Our research deals with construct validity first by comparing 
two structurally similar methods (both walkthrough methods with 4 questions each), and 
by using one well-known method (the Cognitive Walkthrough) and only one new method 
(the Distributed Cognitive Walkthrough) which is one of the experimental interventions 
to be measured. Additionally, the usability finding severity rating scale being used in 
both experimental methods is taken directly from an existing scale that has been used in 
usability practice for many years (Nielsen & Mack, 1994, pg. 49). 
External Validity is related to how well the findings from a comparison of 
UEMs may generalize to real world use of the methods; for example, external validity 
issues arise when the participant population does not reflect the more general practitioner 
population. The goal of the proposed research is to compare two methods that would 
typically be used by novice usability practitioners, designers, and developers of products 
and software. Participants in our research were students who have had the same 
introductory HCI course, and no further HCI coursework, which reasonably matches the 
target of the more general usability evaluation practitioner population. 
Conclusion Validity deals with whether or not the conclusions drawn from 
experimental research go beyond the empirical data, for example making claims that one 
UEM should be preferred over another UEM, with either insufficient empirical data, or 
without proper use of statistical analysis methods to back up such a claim. Generally, 
conclusion validity issues can be seen as the existence of one or more instances of the 
above validity issues, while still drawing conclusions that do not properly caveat the 
conclusions with discussion of the potential validity issues. 
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Summary of Impact of Prior Research on Experimental Design 
The main impact of previous research that has compared UEMs, and the 
“Damaged Merchandise” papers has been taken into account in the planning of the our 
research design and methods to introduce only a minimal number of new evaluation 
constructs (i.e., the new DCW method). Although this reduces the number of tasks and 
UEMs that can be studied (i.e., only a single task will be evaluated by each participant), 
the benefit is that this research was conducted using sample sizes and experimental 
control that is usually unrealistic during practical use of UEMs. 
Our research is focused on the nature of discovered usability findings. Rather than 
differences in the number and types of issues reported (as with most previous 
comparative UEM research), we are interested in the qualitative nature of how usability 
issues and non-issues are reported by participants for a given finding. 
 
6.2 Experimental Research Design 
This section introduces the design of the experimental comparisons (Experiments 
1 and 2). This section provides an overview of the research design with high-level 
introductions of the independent and dependent variables and how they are employed 
across the experimental comparison groups, as well as the main data measures that will 
be collected and analyzed. While the measures to be collected and analyzed will be 
introduced at a high level in this section, the following two sections, experiment data 
analysis, and experimental materials will provide more explicit details related to data 
collection and analysis, and the materials used by experiment participants. 
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Participants 
Participants were undergraduate students who have had the equivalent of one 
course related to Human-Computer Interaction; i.e., they know what usability is in 
general, but don’t have a lot of experience with usability evaluation methods. 
What participants did 
Participants used experimental-group-specific walkthrough-style usability 
evaluation methods to identify potential usability issues for a single task and design 
representation. Participants provided severity ratings for each potential usability issue 
reported. The experimental materials section below presents the specific experimental 
materials used by participants in the experimental groups. 
Expert Judges 
Expert judges evaluated the results of each participant’s experimental evaluations, 
and rated each participant’s findings as part of the data analysis. As noted later in this 
section, and in further detail in the experimental data analysis section, the expert judges 
rated each participant-generated usability evaluation for usability relevance (are the 
statements related to usability), as well as for how actionable each finding is (to what 
degree does the participant state possible changes, as well as what should not change). 
Independent Variables 
 The independent variables used across the two experimental comparisons (shown 
in more detail below) are walkthrough evaluation method, number of users in a scenario, 
and the materiality of the primary artifact in the scenario. 
 
Walkthrough Evaluation Method 
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The walkthrough method used by the experiment participants; either the 
Distributed Cognitive Walkthrough, or the Cognitive Walkthrough. 
 
Number-Of-Users 
A usability evaluator may have different preconceived notions of what cognition 
means, and specifically may expect that individuals have different needs for externalizing 
information (cognition) than do multiple people working together while accomplishing 
the task being evaluated. The number-of-users two-level independent variable is realized 
in the experiment scenarios through the use of scenarios that differ in whether there is a 
single coffee shop employee working versus two employees working. In the scenarios 
where there is a single worker, the worker would be externalizing information used a 
small amount of time later by him or herself. The importance of this is that it may seem 
more natural for such externalization of drink order information in the scenarios where 
two workers are present (i.e., the first worker is externalizing information for the second 
worker). 
 
Materiality 
The materiality of an artifact can impact expectations of how such an artifact is to 
be evaluated for usability. The materiality two-level independent variable is realized in 
the experiment scenario artifact as either a paper cup with markings on it or a digital 
order tracking system representation for representing drink orders. 
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6.3 Use of Primary and Secondary Experimental Comparisons 
 
An initial 2X2 experimental design (Experiment 1) was used to explore the first 
two independent variables, walkthrough method (DCW or CW method), and number-of-
users (1 or 2 workers in scenario). A secondary 1X2 experimental design (Experiment 2) 
was subsequently employed to explore the materiality independent variable (paper cup or 
digital interface), using only the DCW walkthrough method, and only a 2-worker 
scenario. Therefore, Experiment 1 (2X2 design) uses only a paper cup representation, 
with the more detailed exploration of the concept of materiality being addressed in the 
secondary Experiment 2 (1X2 design).  
 
Experiment 1 
 
Experiment 1 Groups (4 between-subject groups, by walkthrough method and 
number-of-users) 
1) Distributed Cognitive Walkthrough method (as developed in this dissertation). 
a) DCW-1: A single employee makes use of a cup to represent the ordered drink 
information, and the same employee is responsible for making the correct drinks. 
b) DCW-2: Two employees make use of a cup to represent the ordered drink 
information. The first employee is responsible for representing drink order 
information (by marking info on the cup and yelling the order out loud), and the 
second employee is responsible for making the correct drinks. 
2) Cognitive Walkthrough method: Four-question version of the method based on an 
existing three-question version of the CW method (Sharp, et al., 2002) with the 
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addition of the original first of the four questions (Nielsen & Mack, 1994, ch. 5) 
(Polson, et al., 1992). 
a) CW-1: A single employee makes use of a cup to represent the ordered drink 
information, and the same employee is responsible for making the correct drinks. 
b) CW-2: Two employees make use of a cup to represent the ordered drink 
information. The first employee is responsible for representing drink order 
information (by marking info on the cup and yelling the order out loud), and the 
second employee is responsible for making the correct drinks. 
 
 
Figure 9. Experimental design for Experiment 1. 
 
 
 
Experiment 2 
 
The impact of Materiality on usability evaluation will be explored in a secondary 
experiment, Experiment 2. Participants in both Experiment 2 groups used the DCW 
  
 
   
          
 
 
  
  60   
method, and evaluated either the 1-worker or 2-worker scenario (one of the two levels of 
the number of users independent variable). Experiment 2 will therefore focus on a the 
impact of materiality on usability evaluation (evaluation of a cup versus a digital order 
tracking system interface). 
 
Experiment 2 Groups (1X2 design, by Materiality; digital versus cup) 
1) Distributed Cognitive Walkthrough method. 
a) DCW-Digital: Two employees make use of digital order tracking system interface 
to represent the ordered drink information. The first employee is responsible for 
representing drink order information (by entering drink info in the order tracking 
system and by yelling the order out loud), and the second employee is responsible 
for making the correct drinks. 
b) DCW-Cup: Two employees make use of a cup to represent the ordered drink 
information. The first employee is responsible for representing drink order 
information (by marking info on the cup and yelling the order out loud), and the 
second employee is responsible for making the correct drinks. 
 
 
Figure 10. Experimental design for Experiment 2. 
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Dependent Variables 
 
This section provides detailed descriptions of the data that were collected, 
including how the data was collected, as well as who rated the data (participant, expert 
judges). Each of the main experimental dependent variable measures that were collected 
and analyzed is introduced below. For each dependent variable measure, the same sets of 
attributes are discussed with the goal of expressing the contribution of each measure to 
the research. The following attributes are discussed for each dependent variable: 
 
Description: A basic introductory description will be provided for each measure that is 
to be collected. 
Data Collection: The method of data collection will be discussed, including who 
(participant, expert group) was involved in the data collection and how the coding/rating 
that produces the measure data was carried out. 
Research Value: This attribute of each measure will discuss the contribution of the 
measure to the research. Because one notion of statistical conclusion validity is to not 
collect every possible measure, and in addition to not attempt to perform every possible 
unplanned, post-experiment statistical test (i.e., “fishing” for results), it is important to 
discuss why each measure (and related analysis method) was chosen for its specific 
contribution to the research. 
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Average Severity Rating 
The average severity rating represents a complete evaluation by a participant. In 
other words, the average severity rating for a single use of one of the experimental 
walkthrough methods. This average is over all four questions during the single use of a 
walkthrough evaluation method. Both of the experimental UEMs (DCW and CW) ask 
four questions, with each question being an opportunity to find one or more usability 
issues. This allows the average usability severity to be used to compare the two methods 
across the dependent variables. 
Participants provided an answer of either Yes or No for each of the 4 questions in 
a method. For each answer of No, the participant will provide a severity rating from 0 (no 
usability issue) to 4 (catastrophic usability issue). The average severity rating will be the 
mean of the individual severity ratings for an individual participant using a method for 
the evaluation (answers of ‘Yes’ are scored as a zero to come up with this average 
severity). 
It is important to understand how the differences in the underlying theories for 
each of the evaluation methods impacts what is considered a good or bad design, with 
respect to accomplishing a specific task. This measure of the average severity rating 
provides the most direct assessment of the usability of a design for a task, with respect to 
the evaluation method used. 
Beyond the information provided by looking at the severity ratings individually 
for a given issue, information regarding the nature of a given UEM may be seen in how 
the usability issues relate when sorted by severity rating. Related to the goal of actionable 
information about each usability issue found by a UEM, a list of usability issues found 
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using a given UEM sorted by severity rating provides a prescription of which issues 
should be dealt with first (setting aside business and resource costs that come into play in 
reality when choosing which issues to fix in which order). This prescription of which 
issues should be dealt with first is an attribute of the UEM used; moreover, the value of 
such a priority list can be looked at as a general measure of how actionable a UEM is. For 
example, if use of a given UEM tends to result in usability issue findings that all have 
similar severity ratings (i.e., low variance), these results are less actionable, in that more 
work must still be done by the usability practitioner to prioritize the issues. 
 
Actionability Rating 
The ultimate reason for conducting usability evaluations is to provide information 
on what should be changed (or left alone). Therefore, usability findings should be as 
actionable as possible, meaning that the description of the usability issue should indicate 
what the issue is in a way that indicates what could or should be changed (for negative 
issues), or what is contributing to good usability (for positive issues) as explicitly as 
possible. This measure represents how actionable each participant-generated usability 
evaluation is. 
A group of 2 experts were given the evaluation results from all participants from 
all of the experimental evaluation groups (including both Experiment 1 and 2). The 
results were made anonymous with respect to experimental group. The group of expert 
judges rated the actionability of the individual evaluations using a scale of 1–5 (where 5 
is the most actionable).  
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Although in usability evaluation practice, many reports and other deliverables 
expressing the findings are created, the real goal of usability evaluation is to provide 
useful information that can inform a relevant change (i.e., next design iteration) in what 
was evaluated, although in some cases summative evaluation is used to simply “score” 
the design. The focus of this research is in the value of methods for formative usability 
evaluation, where the goal is to inform the next design iteration. 
 
Usability Relevance Rating 
One of the goals of this research is to compare how well usability novices conduct 
walkthrough style usability evaluations across the intervening independent variables. This 
measure provides an overall rating with respect to how well each complete participant 
evaluation makes statements relevant to usability. 
A group of 2 experts were given the evaluation results from all participants from 
all of the experimental evaluation groups (including both Experiment 1 and 2). The 
participant data was made anonymous (as much as possible) with respect to which 
method was used. The group of expert judges individually rated the usability relevance of 
each complete usability evaluation (i.e., for one participant) using a scale of 1–5 (where 5 
is the most relevant to usability). 
Participants for this research are novices in usability evaluation, therefore making 
it important to understand if the findings that represent usability issues are considered 
relevant by someone with considerably more experience in the area of usability (i.e., the 
expert judges). 
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Attribution of Responsibility of Cognition 
Many usability evaluation methods are based on strong cognitivist theories, 
therefore biasing the UEM towards laying the responsibility of cognition on the human 
user(s). One goal of this research is to discuss how the use of distributed cognitive 
theories can be applied to create UEMs that move the focus from the human to the 
intersection of humans and external actors (e.g., artifacts, environmental elements, 
cultural and social norms) with respect to viewing where and how “cognition” occurs. 
The “attribution of responsibility” will be addressed not through statistical analysis, but 
will instead be highlighted in the discussion of qualitative differences noticeable (by the 
author) between experimental groups that statistical analysis has shown to differ with 
respect to any of the above dependent variables. This discussion can be found in the 
discussion of results chapter, as well as the conclusions and future research chapter. This 
possibility and usefulness of noticing such qualitative differences in the evaluations was 
discovered during pilot testing. Pilot testing resulted in somewhat surprising explicitness 
(for novices) in participant responses, especially with respect to the distributed cognitive 
view of external resources being responsible for, or carrying out, cognitive work.  
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6.4 Data Collection Instruments 
 
Pre/Post-Task Questionnaires 
 
Pre-Task Questionnaire 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
Please answer the following questions placing a checkmark in the appropriate box. 
 
What is your age? 
 
 [   ] 18 – 25 
[   ] 26 – 35 
[   ] 36 – 45 
[   ] 46 – 55 
[   ] 56 and over 
 
 
What academic year are you currently in? 
 
 [   ] Freshman 
[   ] Sophomore 
[   ] Pre-Junior 
[   ] Junior 
[   ] Senior 
 
 
What is your current major? 
 
 
 
 
How many Human-Computer Interaction courses have you taken? 
 
 [   ] 0 courses 
 [   ] 1 – 2 courses 
 [   ] 3 – 4 courses 
 [   ] 5 – 6 courses 
 [   ] 7 or more courses 
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How many software development courses have you taken? 
 
 [   ] 0 courses 
 [   ] 1 – 2 courses 
 [   ] 3 – 4 courses 
 [   ] 5 – 6 courses 
 [   ] 7 or more courses 
 
 
How many months/years job experience do you have designing software systems? 
 
 [   ] 0 – 6 months 
 [   ] 7 – 12 months 
 [   ] 1 – 2 years 
 [   ] 3 – 4 years 
 [   ] 5 – 6 years 
 [   ] 7 or more years 
 
 
How many months/years job experience do you have evaluating software systems for 
usability? 
 
[   ] 0 – 6 months 
 [   ] 7 – 12 months 
 [   ] 1 – 2 years 
 [   ] 3 – 4 years 
 [   ] 5 – 6 years 
 [   ] 7 or more years 
 
 
 
Thanks again for your participation. 
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Post-Task Questionnaire 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
Please place an X in the box that expresses your level of agreement or disagreement with 
the following statements. 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
I understood the four method 
questions. 
     
I think the method questions helped 
me in identifying usability issues. 
     
I clearly understood how to answer 
the questions. 
     
I would use the questions in the 
future. 
     
I think all usability evaluators 
should use the questions. 
     
I understood what I was asked to 
do. 
     
I enjoyed this activity.      
 
 
 
What did you enjoy about this activity? 
 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
What did you dislike about this activity? 
 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
  
 
   
          
 
 
  
  69   
Which of the following usability evaluation techniques are you aware of? 
[   ] Heuristic Evaluation 
[   ] Usability Testing 
[   ] Cognitive Walkthrough 
[   ] Task Analysis 
[   ] Keystroke Level Modeling 
[   ] GOMS Analysis 
[   ] Other__________________________________ 
 
Which of the following usability evaluation techniques have you used? 
[   ] Heuristic Evaluation 
[   ] Usability Testing 
[   ] Cognitive Walkthrough 
[   ] Task Analysis 
[   ] Keystroke Level Modeling 
[   ] GOMS Analysis 
[   ] Other__________________________________ 
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Experimental Materials 
 
This section presents the materials that were provided to the participants in 
different experimental groups. The pre/post-task questionnaires shown in the previous 
section were given to all participants.  
 
Common materials for all experimental method groups 
 
All experimental method groups used similar task scenario for evaluation (i.e., 
coffee shop scenario with the same drinks being ordered). Specifically, evaluation is 
conducted for usability with respect to a user accomplishing the main task (making 
correct espresso drinks) in the scenario. Typically, in use of scenarios for user-centered, 
scenario-based design efforts, the task scenario is described in a manner such that artifact 
design details are not supplied; in other words, the scenario represents what is being 
accomplished by a user while the task is accomplished, without specifying how it is being 
accomplished. 
A main goal of this research is the comparison of the UEMs being studied over 
multiple interaction types (e.g., individuals interacting with themselves over time versus 
multiple people working together) to address the idea of usability issues raised in the 
literature review that arise over time, space, and social spaces. Each experimental 
scenario evaluation will constitute a single use of a walkthrough method appropriate to 
the experimental group the participant is assigned to; i.e., a participant in the DCW 
method group will use the DCW method one time. 
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Experiment Scenarios  
 
1-Worker, Paper Cup Scenario (Used in both the DCW-1 and CW-1 groups for 
Experiment 1) 
 
2-Worker, Paper Cup Scenario (Used in both the DCW-2 and CW-2 groups for 
Experiment 1, and the Paper Cup Scenario in Experiment 2) 
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2-Worker, Digital Order Tracking Scenario Used in Experiment 2 
 
(All three types of scenarios mentioned above are shown below) 
 
 
Instructions: Read the scenario below, then fill out the usability evaluation form.  
 
Scenario: 
 
A customer walks into a busy coffee shop where two employees are working. The first 
worker is standing at a cash register taking drink orders from customers, while the second 
worker, who is standing further away near an espresso machine, is making the drinks. 
 
The customer tells the first worker who is at the cash register he would like: 
“one large Café Mocha with half decaf, skim milk, no whipped cream, and    
 one medium Café Mocha with 2% milk, extra shot of espresso.” 
 
This same first worker at the register yells the customer’s order to the second worker. 
“one large Mocha, half-caf, nonfat, no whip, and    
 one medium Mocha, 2%, extra shot.” 
 
The first worker at the register then marks up two cups based on the customer’s order 
(see cup sketches below), and hands the cups to the second worker. The second worker is 
responsible for making all of the drinks. 
 
 
 
The second worker then proceeds to make the two drinks. 
 
 
 
What you need to do: Based on the above scenario, fill out the usability 
evaluation form, focusing on the task below. 
 
Task to evaluate: The second worker who is responsible for making the 
drinks has to correctly make the drinks as ordered by the customer.  
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Instructions: Read the scenario below, then fill out the usability evaluation form.  
 
Scenario: 
 
A customer walks into a busy coffee shop where one employee is working. 
 
The customer tells the worker he would like: 
“one large Café Mocha with half decaf, skim milk, no whipped cream, and    
      one medium Café Mocha with 2% milk, extra shot of espresso.” 
 
The worker marks up two cups based on the customer’s order (see cup sketches 
below). 
 
 
 
The worker then proceeds to make the two drinks. 
 
 
 
 
 
What you need to do: Based on the above scenario, fill out the usability 
evaluation form, focusing on the task below. 
 
Task to evaluate: The worker has to correctly make the drinks as ordered 
by the customer. 
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Instructions: Read the scenario below, then fill out the usability evaluation form.  
 
Scenario: 
A customer walks into a busy coffee shop where two employees are working. The first 
worker is standing at a cash register taking drink orders from customers, while the second 
worker, who is standing further away near an espresso machine, is making the drinks. 
 
The customer tells the first worker who is at the cash register he would like: 
“one large Café Mocha with half decaf, skim milk, no whipped cream, and    
 one medium Café Mocha with 2% milk, extra shot of espresso.” 
 
This same first worker at the register yells the customer’s order to the second worker. 
“one large Mocha, half-caf, nonfat, no whip, and    
 one medium Mocha, 2%, extra shot.” 
 
This same first worker enters the drink orders into the order management system based 
on the customer’s order. 
 
The second worker who is responsible for making all drinks then proceeds to make the 
two drinks that the customer ordered, referring to the order management system interface 
as needed (the interface screenshot below shows the current drink order). 
 
 
 
What you need to do: Based on the above scenario, fill out the usability 
evaluation form, focusing on the task below. 
 
Task to evaluate: The second worker who is responsible for making the 
drinks has to correctly make the drinks as ordered by the customer.  
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Distributed Cognitive Walkthrough (DCW) Method Questions 
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Cognitive Walkthrough (CW) Method Questions 
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CHAPTER 7: RESULTS 
 
 
 This chapter presents the data analysis methodology and results arranged by 
experimental comparison (Experiments 1 and 2), and by research question within each 
experiment. Interpretative discussion of the results can be found in the following 
Discussion of Results chapter. Additionally, the final Conclusions and Future Research 
chapter further discusses implications of the results. The remainder of this chapter is 
organized in the following manner: 
7.1 Organization of Results 
 
Introduction and Summary of Statistical Results 
 
Experiment 1 
• RQ1: Reported Severity by method and number-of-users 
• RQ2: Actionability by method and number-of-users 
• RQ3: Usability Relevance by method and number-of-users 
• RQ4: Attribution of Responsibility of Cognitive Activity by method and number-
of-users 
• RQ5: Subjective Perception of Method (understandability and usefulness) by 
method and number-of-users 
Experiment 2 
• RQ6: Reported Severity by materiality 
• RQ7: Actionability by materiality 
• RQ8: Usability Relevance by materiality 
• RQ9: Attribution of Responsibility of Cognitive Activity by materiality 
• RQ10: Subjective Perception of Method (understandability and usefulness) by 
materiality 
 
7.2 Introduction and Summary of Statistical Results 
 
An initial 2X2 experimental design (Experiment 1) was used to explore the 
walkthrough method and number of users independent variables. A secondary 1X2 
experimental design (Experiment 2) was subsequently employed to explore the 
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materiality independent variable, using only the DCW walkthrough method, and only a 2-
worker scenario. Therefore, Experiment 1 (2X2 design) uses only a paper cup 
representation, with the more detailed exploration of the concept of materiality is 
addressed in the secondary Experiment 2 (1X2 design).  
 
In Experiment 1, three main dependent variables were explored; actionability, 
usability relevance, and average participant reported severity. The two independent 
variables were walkthrough method and number of users. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
was used for between-subject analysis of how the independent variables differentially 
impacted the dependent variables. Two-way mixed intra-class correlation was used for 
inter-rated reliability of the actionability and usability relevance ratings provided by the 2 
expert judges. Expert ratings for both actionability and usability relevance were 
significantly correlated, with respect to inter-rater reliability. Table 1 below summarizes 
the statistical results for analysis of Experiment 1 that are reported in more detail in the 
following sections. 
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Table 1. Summary of results for experiment 1 
RQ1 Severity 
RQ1.1 Method (CW 
or  DCW) 
Significant main effect. F(1, 38) = 6.71, p = 0.01 
RQ1.2 Number of 
users 
Non-significant. F(1, 38) = 0.23, p = 0.63 
RQ2 Actionability 
RQ2.1 Method Significant main effect. F(1, 38) = 6.33, p = 0.02 
RQ2.2 Number of 
users 
Non-significant. F(1, 38) = 0.23, p = 0.64 
RQ3 Usability Relevance  
RQ3.1 Method Significant main effect. F(1, 38) = 15.43, p = 0.00 
RQ3.2 Number of 
users 
Non-significant. F(1, 38) = 0.93, p = 0.34 
RQ4 Attribution of Cognitive Responsibility  
RQ4.1 Method Qualitative differences discussed in Results Discussion chapter 
RQ4.2 Number of 
users 
Qualitative differences discussed in Results Discussion chapter 
RQ5 Subjective perception of method 
RQ5.1 Method Non-significant. 
RQ5.2 Number of 
users 
Non-significant. 
 
 
In Experiment 2, the same three main dependent variables were explored; 
actionability, usability relevance, and average participant reported severity. The single 
independent variable was materiality. Analysis of variance was used for between-group 
analysis of how the independent variable differentially impacted the dependent variables. 
Table 2 below summarizes the statistical results for analysis of Experiment 2 that are 
reported in more detail in the following sections.  
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Table 2. Summary of results for experiment 2 
RQ6 Severity  
RQ6.1 Materiality Significant main effect. F(1, 20) = 4.29, p = 0.05 
RQ7 Actionability  
RQ7.1 Materiality Non-significant, but large effect size. F(1, 20) = 3.40, p = 0.08 
RQ8 Usability Relevance  
RQ8.1 Materiality Non-significant. F(1, 20) = 6.71, p = 0.28 
RQ9 Attribution of Cognitive Responsibility     
RQ9.1 Materiality Qualitative differences discussed in Results Discussion chapter 
RQ10 Subjective perception of method 
RQ10.1 Materiality Non-significant. 
 
 
 
Overview of sample population 
 
Participants were undergraduate students who have had the equivalent one course 
in Human-Computer Interaction offered by the iSchool at Drexel University. 
 
7.3 Experiment 1 Results Summary 
 
 Between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to investigate 
differences in usability evaluations. Three dependent variables were used: actionability, 
usability relevance, and participant reported severity. The independent variables were 
walkthrough method, and number of users (in the experimental scenarios). 
 As reported in more detail in the following sections, organized by research 
question, significant differences were found for the impact of walkthrough method on 
actionability, usability relevance, and participant reported usability severity. The 
Distributed Cognitive Walkthrough (DCW) method resulted in higher mean ratings than 
the Cognitive Walkthrough (CW) method across all three of these significant differences. 
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 No significant differences were found for the impact of the number of users in a 
scenario on actionability, usability relevance, and participant reported usability severity. 
Although no significant differences were found for the impact of the number of users in a 
scenario, in the case of severity and actionability, interesting differences are noted in that 
the DCW method groups performed more consistently (near-equal means) than the CW 
groups across the differing number of users. This is discussed in later chapters as giving 
insight into possible robustness in the DCW method, with respect to context of use 
variations that could be explored in future research. 
 
7.4 RQ 1 Reported Usability Severity by Method and Number-of-Users 
 
Two-way between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to 
investigate the impact of walkthrough method and number of users on the usability 
severity reported by participants. Because no interaction effects were found between the 
walkthrough method and number of users factors, results are reported through 
presentation of the univariate between subjects effects (for clarity in results presentation). 
RQ1.1: Reported Usability Severity by Method 
 
 This section reports results for how walkthrough evaluation method differentially 
impacted the usability severity reported by participants. Participants were asked to 
answer yes or no to each of the four method questions. For any answer of No, participants 
were asked to rate the potential usability issue from 0-4 (see figure 11 below). The 
dependent variable Severity is based on an average of these values for each participant 
usability evaluation. In cases where a participant answered Yes to a question (i.e., no 
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severity rating provided for that question), a value of 0 was used in coming up with the 
average severity value for the dependent variable. 
 
 
Figure 11. Structure of method questions answered by participants during usability 
evaluation, and severity ratings used by participants. 
 
 
 
RQ1.1: Is there a difference in average usability severity ratings by walkthrough 
evaluation method. 
 
HYP1.1: There is a difference in average usability severity ratings by walkthrough 
evaluation method. 
 
Between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test the effect of 
method, the Distributed Cognitive Walkthrough (DCW) method or the Cognitive 
Walkthrough (CW) method on the average usability severity reported by participants. 
The means and standard deviations are shown in Table 3, below. 
 
3. Will the user see how to achieve the task? 
Answer (Yes/No, and Explain): 
 
If answer on left is No, circle choice and explain: 
0 = No usability issue at all  
1 = Cosmetic problem only 
2 = Minor usability problem  
3 = Major usability problem  
4 = Usability catastrophe 
Explanation: 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for severity by method 
Descriptive Statistics 
Severity by Method 
Method Mean Std. Deviation N 
CW 0.82 0.95 21 
DCW 1.68 1.15 21 
Total 1.25 1.13 42 
 
 
 
We found a statistically significant difference between walkthrough method 
groups on the average usability severity reported by participants, F(1, 38) = 6.71, p = 
0.01. An inspection of the mean scores (see Table 3 above) indicated that the Distributed 
Cognitive Walkthrough method group participants reported higher severity ratings (M = 
1.68, SD = 1.15) than the Cognitive Walkthrough method group participants (M = 0.82, 
SD = 0.95). 
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Figure 12. Means plot for severity by method  
 
 
 
RQ1.2: Reported Usability Severity by Number of Users 
 
This section reports results for how the number of users in the experimental 
evaluation scenario (1 or 2 workers) differentially impacted the usability severity 
reported by participants. Participants were asked to answer yes or no to each of the four 
method questions. For any answer of No, participants were asked to rate the potential 
usability issue from 0-4 (see Figure 13 below). The dependent variable Severity is based 
on an average of these values for each participant usability evaluation. In cases where a 
participant answered Yes to a question (i.e., no severity rating provided for that question), 
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a value of 0 was used in coming up with the average severity value for the dependent 
variable. 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Example of a question answered by participants during usability evaluation, 
and severity ratings used by participants 
 
 
 
RQ 1.2: Is there a difference in average usability severity ratings by number-of-users? 
 
HYP 1.2: There is a difference in average usability severity ratings by number-of-users. 
 
Between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test the effect of the 
number of users in the experimental scenarios, either 1 or 2 workers, on the average 
usability severity reported by participants. The means and standard deviations are shown 
in Table 4, below. 
3. Will the user see how to achieve the task? 
Answer (Yes/No, and Explain): 
 
If answer on left is No, circle choice and explain: 
0 = No usability issue at all  
1 = Cosmetic problem only 
2 = Minor usability problem  
3 = Major usability problem  
4 = Usability catastrophe 
Explanation: 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics for severity by number of users 
Descriptive Statistics 
Severity by Number of Users 
Number_
Of_Users Mean Std. Deviation N 
1 1.31 1.12 21 
2 1.19 1.17 21 
Total 1.25 1.13 42 
 
 
 
We did not find a statistically significant difference between number of user 
scenario groups on the average usability severity reported by participants, F(1, 38) = 
0.23, p = 0.63. An inspection of the mean scores (see Table 4 above) indicated that the 1-
worker scenario group participants reported higher severity ratings (M = 1.31, SD = 1.12) 
than the 2-worker group evaluations (M = 1.19, SD = 1.17). 
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Figure 14. Means plot for Severity by Number of users 
 
 
 
 Although no significant differences were found for the impact of the number of 
users in a scenario on usability severity reported by participants, interesting differences 
are noted in that the DCW method groups performed more consistently (near-equal 
means) than the CW groups across the differing number of users (See Figure 15 below). 
As presented in a later section, a similar, yet slightly weaker version of this was also 
found for the impact of number of users on actionability. This is discussed in later 
chapters as giving insight into possible robustness in the DCW method, with respect to 
context of use variations that could be explored in future research. 
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Figure 15. Means plots of severity by method and number of users 
 
 
 
7.5 RQ 2 Actionability by Method and Number-of-Users 
 
Two-way between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to 
investigate the impact of walkthrough method and number of users on the actionability of 
the participant evaluations as rated by the expert judges. Because no interaction effects 
were found between the walkthrough method and number of users factors, results are 
reported through presentation of the univariate between subjects effects (for clarity in 
results presentation). 
 
RQ2.1: Actionability by Method 
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This section reports results for how walkthrough evaluation method differentially 
impacted the actionability ratings of participant evaluations. A group of 2 experts were 
given the evaluation results from all participants from all of the experimental evaluation 
groups (including both Experiment 1 and 2). The results were made anonymous with 
respect to experimental group. The group of expert judges rated the actionability of the 
individual evaluations using a scale of 1–5 (5 is the most actionable). 
 
RQ 2.1: Is there a difference in actionability ratings by walkthrough evaluation method? 
 
HYP 2.1: There is a difference in actionability ratings by walkthrough evaluation method. 
 
 
Between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test the effect of 
method, the Distributed Cognitive Walkthrough (DCW) method or the Cognitive 
Walkthrough (CW) method on the actionability of the evaluations. The means and 
standard deviations are shown in Table 5, below. 
 
 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for actionability by method 
Descriptive Statistics 
Actionability by Method 
Method Mean Std. Deviation N 
CW 1.71 0.69 21 
DCW 2.38 0.97 21 
Total 2.04 0.90 42 
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A statistically significant difference was found between walkthrough method 
groups on the actionability of the evaluations, F(1, 38) = 6.33, p = 0.02. An inspection of 
the mean scores (see Table 5 above) indicated that the Distributed Cognitive 
Walkthrough method group evaluations were given higher actionability ratings (M = 
2.38, SD = 0.97) than the Cognitive Walkthrough method group evaluations (M = 1.71, 
SD = 0.69). 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Means plot for actionability by method 
 
 
 
RQ2.2: Actionability by Number of Users 
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This section reports results for how the number of users in the experimental 
evaluation scenario (1 or 2 workers) differentially impacted the actionability ratings of 
participant evaluations. A group of 2 experts were given the evaluation results from all 
participants from all of the experimental evaluation groups (including both Experiment 1 
and 2). The results were made anonymous with respect to experimental group. The group 
of expert judges rated the actionability of the individual evaluations using a scale of 1–5 
(5 is the most actionable). 
 
RQ 2.2: Is there a difference in actionability ratings by number-of-users? 
HYP 2.2: There is a difference in actionability ratings by number-of-users. 
 
Between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test the effect of the 
number of users in the experimental evaluation scenario, either 1 or 2 workers, on the 
actionability ratings of the evaluations. The means and standard deviations are shown in 
Table 6, below. 
 
 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics for actionability ratings by number of users 
Descriptive Statistics 
Actionability by Number of Users 
Number_
Of_Users Mean Std. Deviation N 
1 2.09 0.83 21 
2 2.00 0.99 21 
Total 2.05 0.90 42 
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We did not find a statistically significant difference between walkthrough method 
groups on the actionability of the evaluations, F(1, 38) = 0.23, p = 0.64. An inspection of 
the mean scores (see Table 6 above) indicated that the 1-worker scenario group 
evaluations were given slightly higher actionability ratings (M = 2.1, SD = 0.83) than the 
2-worker scenario group evaluations (M = 2.00, SD = 0.90). 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Means plot for actionability by number of users 
 
 
 
 Although no significant differences were found for the impact of the number of 
users in a scenario on actionability, interesting differences are noted in that the DCW 
method groups performed more consistently (near-equal means) than the CW groups 
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across the differing number of users (See Figure 18 below). As presented in an earlier 
section, a similar, and stronger version of this was also found for the impact of number of 
users on severity. This is discussed in later chapters as giving insight into possible 
robustness in the DCW method, with respect to context of use variations that could be 
explored in future research. 
 
 
Figure 18. Means plots of actionability by method and number of users 
 
 
 
7.6 RQ 3 Usability Relevance by Method and Number-of-Users 
 
Two-way between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to 
investigate the impact of walkthrough method and number of users on the usability 
relevance of the participant evaluations as rated by the expert judges. Because no 
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interaction effects were found between the walkthrough method and number of users 
factors, results are reported through presentation of the univariate between subjects 
effects (for clarity in results presentation). 
 
RQ3.1: Usability Relevance by Method 
 
This section reports results for how walkthrough evaluation method differentially 
impacted the usability relevance ratings of participant evaluations. A group of 2 experts 
were given the evaluation results from all participants from all of the experimental 
evaluation groups (including both Experiment 1 and 2). The results were made 
anonymous with respect to experimental group. The group of expert judges rated the 
usability relevance of the individual evaluations using a scale of 1–5 (5 is the highest 
usability relevance). 
 
RQ 3.1: Is there a difference in usability relevance ratings by walkthrough evaluation 
method? 
 
HYP 3.1: There is a difference in usability relevance ratings by walkthrough evaluation 
method. 
 
Between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test the effect of 
method, the Distributed Cognitive Walkthrough (DCW) method or the Cognitive 
Walkthrough (CW) method on the usability relevance of the evaluations. The means and 
standard deviations are shown in Table 7, below. 
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Table 7. Descriptive statistics for usability relevance by method 
Descriptive Statistics 
Usability Relevance by Method 
Method Mean Std. Deviation N 
CW 1.80 0.77 21 
DCW 2.76 0.80 21 
Total 2.29 0.91 42 
 
 
 
A statistically significant difference was found between walkthrough method 
groups on the usability relevance of the evaluations, F(1, 38) = 15.43, p = 0.00. An 
inspection of the mean scores (see Table 7 above) indicated that the Distributed 
Cognitive Walkthrough method group evaluations were given higher usability relevance 
ratings (M = 2.76, SD = 0.80) than the Cognitive Walkthrough method group evaluations 
(M = 1.81, SD = 0.77). 
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Figure 19. Means plot for usability relevance by method. 
 
 
 
RQ3.2: Usability Relevance by Number of Users 
 
This section reports results for how the number of users in the experimental 
evaluation scenario (1 or 2 workers) differentially impacted the usability relevance 
ratings of participant evaluations. A group of 2 experts were given the evaluation results 
from all participants from all of the experimental evaluation groups (including both 
Experiment 1 and 2). The results were made anonymous with respect to experimental 
group. The group of expert judges rated the usability relevance of the individual 
evaluations using a scale of 1–5 (5 is the most actionable). 
 
RQ 3.2: Is there a difference in usability relevance ratings by number-of-users? 
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HYP 3.2: There is a difference in usability relevance ratings by number-of-users. 
 
Between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test the effect of the 
number of users in the experimental evaluation scenario, either 1 or 2 workers, on the 
usability relevance ratings of the evaluations. The means and standard deviations are 
shown in Table 8, below. 
 
 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics for usability relevance ratings by number of users 
Descriptive Statistics 
Usability Relevance by Number of Users 
Number_Of
_Users Mean Std. Deviation N 
1 2.38 0.85 21 
2 2.19 0.98 21 
Total 2.28 0.91 42 
 
 
 
We did not find a statistically significant difference between walkthrough method 
groups on the usability relevance of the evaluations, F(1, 38) = 0.93, p = 0.34. An 
inspection of the mean scores (see Table 8 above) indicated that the 1-worker scenario 
group evaluations were given slightly higher usability relevance ratings (M = 2.38, SD = 
0.85) than the 2-worker scenario group evaluations (M = 2.19, SD = 0.98). 
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Figure 20. Means plot for usability relevance by number of users 
 
 
 
7.7 RQ 4 Attribution of Cognitive Responsibility by Method and Number-of-Users 
 
 Differences in the attribution of cognitive responsibility (who or what the 
evaluator sees as responsible for task accomplishment) will be addressed later in the 
discussion of results chapter, by looking at qualitative differences in the evaluation 
statements related to the above statistical analyses. 
 
 
7.8 RQ 5 Subjective Perception of Method by Method and Number-of-Users 
 
 Participants were asked to rate the level of understanding of the walkthrough 
method questions, as well as how useful the method seemed. No significant differences 
were found, which serves as credibility for all of the other results above (i.e., if one 
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method was well understand, while another was not, it may be difficult to argue the 
validity of results comparing the methods). 
 
7.9 Experiment 2 Results Summary 
 
Between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to investigate 
differences in usability evaluations. Three main dependent variables were used: 
actionability, usability relevance, and participant reported severity. The independent 
variable was the materiality of the artifact (paper versus digital) that was the primary 
focus of the evaluation in the experimental scenario. 
As reported in more detail in the following sections, organized by research 
question, significant differences were found for the impact of materiality on participant 
reported usability severity. The digital materiality group resulted in higher severity means 
than the paper materiality group. 
 No significant differences were found for the impact of the materiality on 
actionability or usability relevance. Although no significant differences were found for 
actionability, the large effect size, partial eta squared = 0.146 (along with a “near-
significant” p value of 0.08) is at least as large as one, and larger than two of the effect 
sizes of the three significant differences found in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 used 
sample sizes half that of Experiment 1, and we feel that the large effect size found for the 
impact of materiality on actionability deserves noteworthy discussion in the later 
Discussion of Results chapter. In addition to the large effect size, and near significant 
level, it is interesting that while in Experiment 1 all three dependent variables moved in 
the same direction, in Experiment 2 the reported severity moves in the opposite direction 
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as the actionability and usability relevance. This will be discussed in later chapters as 
possibly the most interesting result given the implications for usability evaluation and 
design practice. 
 
7.10 RQ 6 Reported Usability Severity by Materiality 
 
One-way between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to 
investigate the impact of materiality on the usability severity reported by participants. 
RQ6.1: Reported Usability Severity by Materiality 
 
This section reports results for how materiality differentially impacted the 
usability severity reported by participants. Participants were asked to answer yes or no to 
each of the four method questions. For any answer of No, participants were asked to rate 
the potential usability issue from 0-4 (see figure 21 below). The dependent variable 
Severity is based on an average of these values for each participant usability evaluation. 
In cases where a participant answered Yes to a question (i.e., no severity rating provided 
for that question), a value of 0 was used in coming up with the average severity value for 
the dependent variable. 
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Figure 21. Example of a question answered by participants during usability evaluation, 
and severity ratings used by participants 
 
 
 
RQ6.1: Is there a difference in average usability severity ratings by materiality. 
HYP6.1: There is a difference in average usability severity ratings by materiality. 
 
Between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test the effect of 
materiality, paper versus digital on the average usability severity reported by participants. 
The means and standard deviations are shown in Table 9, below. 
 
 
 
Table 9. Descriptive statistics for average usability severity by materiality 
Descriptive Statistics 
Severity by Materiality 
Materiality Mean Std. Deviation N 
Digital 2.16 1.04 11 
Paper 1.36 0.74 11 
Total 1.76 0.97 22 
 
 
A statistically significant difference was found between materiality groups on the 
average usability severity reported by participants, F(1, 20) = 4.29, p = 0.05. An 
3. Will the user see how to achieve the task? 
Answer (Yes/No, and Explain): 
 
If answer on left is No, circle choice and explain: 
0 = No usability issue at all  
1 = Cosmetic problem only 
2 = Minor usability problem  
3 = Major usability problem  
4 = Usability catastrophe 
Explanation: 
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inspection of the mean scores (see Table 9 above) indicated that the digital materiality 
group participants reported higher severity ratings (M = 2.16, SD = 1.04) than the paper 
materiality group participants (M = 1.36, SD = 0.74). 
 
 
Figure 22. Means plot for severity by materiality 
 
 
 
7.11 RQ 7 Actionability by Materiality 
 
One-way between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to 
investigate the impact materiality on the actionability of the participant evaluations as 
rated by the expert judges. 
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RQ7.1: Actionability by Materiality 
 
This section reports results for how materiality differentially impacted the 
actionability ratings of participant evaluations. A group of 2 experts were given the 
evaluation results from all participants from all of the experimental evaluation groups 
(including both Experiment 1 and 2). The results were made anonymous with respect to 
experimental group. The group of expert judges rated the actionability of the individual 
evaluations using a scale of 1–5 (5 is the most actionable). 
 
RQ 7.1: Is there a difference in actionability ratings by materiality? 
 
HYP 7.1: There is a difference in actionability ratings by materiality. 
 
 
Between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test the effect of 
materiality, paper versus digital on the actionability of the evaluations. The means and 
standard deviations are shown in Table 10, below. 
 
 
 
Table 10. Descriptive statistics for actionability by materiality 
Descriptive Statistics 
Actionability by Materiality 
Materiality Mean Std. Deviation N 
Digital 2.36 0.64 11 
Paper 2.95 0.85 11 
Total 2.66 0.79 22 
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We did not find a statistically significant difference between materiality groups on 
the actionability of the evaluations, F(1, 20) = 3.41, p = 0.08. An inspection of the mean 
scores (see Table 10 above) indicated that the paper materiality group evaluations were 
given higher actionability ratings (M = 2.95, SD = 0.85) than the digital materiality group 
evaluations (M = 2.36, SD = 0.64). 
Although no significant difference was found for actionability, the large effect 
size, partial eta squared = 0.146 (along with a “near-significant” p value of .08) is at least 
as large as one, and larger than two of the effect sizes of the three significant differences 
found in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 used sample sizes half that of Experiment 1, and we 
feel that the large effect size found for the impact of materiality on actionability deserves 
noteworthy discussion in the later Discussion of Results chapter. In addition to the large 
effect size, and near significant level, it is interesting that while in Experiment 1 all three 
dependent variables moved in the same direction, in Experiment 2 the reported severity 
moves in the opposite direction as the actionability and usability relevance. This will be 
discussed in later chapters as an interesting (even if not significant) result given the 
implications for usability evaluation and design practice. 
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Figure 23. Means plot for actionability by materiality 
 
 
 
7.12 RQ 8 Usability Relevance by Materiality 
 
One-way between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to 
investigate the impact of materiality on the usability relevance of the participant 
evaluations as rated by the expert judges. 
 
RQ8.1: Usability Relevance by Materiality 
 
This section reports results for how materiality differentially impacted the 
usability relevance ratings of participant evaluations. A group of 2 experts were given the 
evaluation results from all participants from all of the experimental evaluation groups 
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(including both Experiment 1 and 2). The results were made anonymous with respect to 
experimental group. The group of expert judges rated the usability relevance of the 
individual evaluations using a scale of 1–5 (5 is the highest usability relevance). 
 
RQ 8.1: Is there a difference in usability relevance ratings by materiality? 
 
HYP 8.1: There is a difference in usability relevance ratings by materiality. 
 
 
Between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test the effect of 
materiality, paper versus digital on the usability relevance of the evaluations. The means 
and standard deviations are shown in Table 11, below. 
 
 
 
Table 11. Descriptive statistics for usability relevance by materiality 
Descriptive Statistics 
Usability Relevance by Materiality 
Materiality Mean Std. Deviation N 
Digital 2.63 0.71 11 
Paper 3.00 0.80 11 
Total 2.81 0.76 22 
 
 
 
We did not find a statistically significant difference between materiality groups on 
the usability relevance of the evaluations, F(1, 20) = 1.26, p = 0.28. An inspection of the 
mean scores (see Table 11 above) indicated that the paper materiality group evaluations 
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were given higher usability relevance ratings (M = 3.00, SD = 0.81) than the digital 
materiality group evaluations (M = 2.64, SD = 0.71). 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Means plot for usability relevance by materiality 
 
 
 
7.13 RQ 9 Attribution of Cognitive Responsibility by Materiality 
 
 Differences in the attribution of cognitive responsibility (who or what the 
evaluator sees as responsible for task accomplishment) will be addressed later in the 
Discussion of Results chapter, by looking at qualitative differences in the evaluation 
statements related to the above statistical analyses. 
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7.14 RQ 10 Subjective Perception of Method by Materiality 
 
 Participants were asked to rate the level of understanding of the walkthrough 
method questions, as well as how useful the method seemed. No significant differences 
were found, which serves as credibility for all of the other results above (i.e., if one 
method was well understand, while another was not, it may be difficult to argue the 
validity of results comparing the methods). These results show that the other above 
results were not impacted by differences in whether or not the participants understood the 
questions. 
 
Limitations of the experimental studies 
 Both experimental studies contained the following limitations. Each participant 
only used a walkthrough method once, making it impossible to understand how usage of 
the same method over time would impact the utility of the method, with respect to the 
measures. Walkthrough methods represent a single method from the numerous different 
techniques and methods usually employed by practitioners (e.g., heuristics, design 
patterns, usability testing), and therefore it would be useful in future research to compare 
how the theoretical cognitive ideas being compared via walkthrough methods would 
impact use of such other methods. 
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Chapter 8: Discussion of Results 
 
The most important goal of usability related fields is the creation of products and 
services that conform to how people accomplish things, and how people think. Therefore, 
many usability related methodologies are based on theories of human cognition. Recent 
differing views within the cognitive science field are not represented in current usability 
methodologies. Specifically, current methods are based on more cognitivist theories, with 
almost no representation of distributed and extended cognitive theoretical views. 
  
8.1 Review of High Level Research Questions addressed in this research 
 
 The two experimental studies conducted as part of this research were driven by 
the following high-level research questions: 
 
1. How do usability evaluations conducted using a walkthrough usability evaluation 
method (DCW) based on theories of distributed cognition relate to the use of evaluations 
conducted using a walkthrough evaluation method (CW) based on more cognitivist 
principles? 
 
2. How does the evaluation of usability differ for scenarios involving individual versus 
multiple users of information? 
(How do evaluators consider externalization of cognition for a person interacting with 
him or herself over time versus two people interacting over time?) 
 
3. How does the (intended final) materiality of the artifact or system being evaluated 
impact evaluation? 
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8.2 Main Findings from both experimental studies 
 
 The following main findings from the two experimental studies conducted will be 
discussed in this chapter: 
Experiment 1 main findings: 
1.  An increased focus on external resources resulted in significant increased 
actionability. 
2.  An increased focus on external resources resulted in significant increased reported 
severity of usability issues. 
3.  An increased focus on external resources resulted in significant increased relevance 
to usability. 
4.  An increased focus on external resources lead to increased focus on the context of 
use and the contributions of multiple interacting external and internal resources in 
the accomplishment of activity. 
 
Experiment 2 main findings: 
5.  The DCW applied to high-technology materiality resources resulted in significantly 
increased severity ratings, but with little actionability and usability relevance in the 
discussion of the context of use or the interacting contributions of hard to see 
external and internal resources. 
6.  The DCW applied to low-technology (paper materiality) resources resulted in 
increased actionability and usability relevance in the discussion of the context of 
use, and the interacting contributions of otherwise hard to see external and internal 
resources. (non-significant, but actionability had large effect size) 
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8.3 Experiment 1 Results Discussion Section 
 
 The first two high-level research questions were explored in Experiment 1 and are 
listed below. Specific lower level research questions that specifically relate 
operationalized dependent and independent variables are presented in each subsection 
below along with specific results. 
 
High Level RQ 1: How do usability evaluations conducted using a walkthrough-style 
usability evaluation method based on theories of distributed cognition relate to the use of 
evaluations conducted using existing interaction design and usability walkthrough-style 
evaluation methods based on more cognitivist principles? 
 
High Level RQ 2: How does the evaluation of usability differ for scenarios involving 
individual versus multiple users of information represented in the evaluated artifact? 
(How do evaluators consider externalization of cognition for a person interacting with 
him or herself over time versus two people interacting over time?) 
 
Impact of walkthrough evaluation method on actionability 
 
 A group of 2 experts were given the evaluation results from all participants from 
all of the experimental evaluation groups (including both Experiment 1 and 2). The 
results were made anonymous with respect to experimental group. The group of expert 
judges rated the actionability of the individual evaluations using a scale of 1–5. 
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 The impact of walkthrough method on actionability was explored through 
research question RQ 2.1: 
 
RQ 2.1: Is there a difference in actionability ratings by walkthrough evaluation method? 
HYP 2.1: There is a difference in actionability ratings by walkthrough evaluation method. 
 
 Actionability ratings for evaluations from the Distributed Cognitive Walkthrough 
(DCW) method group were significantly higher than actionability ratings for the 
Cognitive Walkthrough (CW) method group. 
 We argue that usability evaluation methods based on distributed and extended 
cognitive theories result in more actionable evaluations, mainly due to the lack of a focus 
on internal human cognitive resources. This lack of internal resource bias allows for 
usability evaluations to more concretely focus in on which aspects of the interaction 
between internal and external resources contribute both positively and negatively. 
Increased concreteness in contribution of positive and negative aspects of the usability 
then leads to increased actionability through more specific statements regarding what 
should not be changed, what should be changed, and potential changes. The initial focus 
on external resource contribution seen in the DCW method questions help evaluators 
notice otherwise more invisible resources. Because of the default bias of evaluators to be 
drawn to the contribution of human resources (because of user-centered design 
principles), evaluative focus will ultimately gravitate back towards human resources 
anyway, whereas starting with a focus on internal human resources will likely not go 
back towards focus on external resources. The following two figures show examples of 
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typical statements from the DCW and CW method groups that highlight qualitative 
differences in actionability. 
 
 
 
 
“Yes.” 
 
“Of course, the user's goal is always to please the customer.” 
 
“However if we assume the user knows how to make the drink, this is no big deal.” 
 
“The user will be the one trying to achieve the task.” 
Figure 25. Statements from the CW method group that represent less actionable 
statements than those typically found in the DCW group 
 
 
 
“Information should have a sticker non-fat / skim just to make clear info to second 
worker…2nd worker only is able to recognize size the rest of info he supposed to 
memorize…It does not provide enough info…If the task is accomplished is because the 
worker has good memory or maybe write it down and is not because the clues from the 2 
cups.” 
 
“There is nothing written to provide what the user needs. No way to remember.” 
 
“Nothing is marked with detail he may mix and match the orders accidentally because its 
not specified on the cup.” 
 
“The external representation only shows one criteria for the task. User has to store the 
entire order (aside from drink size) in his or her head.” 
Figure 26. Statements from the DCW method group that represent more actionable 
statements than those typically found in the CW group 
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Impact of walkthrough evaluation method on reported usability issue severity. 
 
 The most common way to prioritize usability issues in practice is through the use 
of usability severity ratings. The dependent variable used to operationalize usability issue 
severity was based on the average usability severity reported by participants during the 
evaluation. Participants were asked to answer yes or no to each of the four group-specific 
evaluation method questions; for any answer of No, participants were asked to rate the 
potential usability issue from 0-4 (see figure X below). The dependent variable 
representing severity is based on an average of these values for each participant usability 
evaluation. In cases where a participant answered Yes to a question (i.e., no severity 
rating provided for that question), a value of 0 was used in coming up with the average 
severity value for the dependent variable. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27. Example of a question answered by participants during usability evaluation, 
and severity ratings used by participants 
 
 
 
3. Will the user see how to achieve the task? 
Answer (Yes/No, and Explain): 
 
If answer on left is No, circle choice and explain: 
0 = No usability issue at all  
1 = Cosmetic problem only 
2 = Minor usability problem  
3 = Major usability problem  
4 = Usability catastrophe 
Explanation: 
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 The impact of walkthrough evaluation method (representing external versus 
internal cognitive focus) on reported usability issue severity was explored through 
research question RQ 1.1: 
 
RQ 1.1: Is there a difference in average usability severity ratings by walkthrough 
evaluation method? 
 
HYP 1.1: There is a difference in average usability severity ratings by walkthrough 
evaluation method. 
 
 Participants in the DCW method group reported significantly higher average 
usability issue severity ratings than participants in the CW method group. 
 Severity may be higher with a focus on external resources because evaluators will 
be more likely to blame external artifacts than humans, because there is an expectation 
that artifacts (technology) represent a designed solution to problems humans cannot solve 
alone. In the case of a method that focuses on internal resources (i.e., the CW method, 
focusing on user knowledge), humans are seen as more responsible for accomplishment 
of the activity, but typical statements reflect an expectation that humans can easily be 
trained, or are in many cases assumed to already have appropriate experiential knowledge 
simply because of placement in the scenario (e.g., a coffee shop worker is assumed to 
have necessary knowledge of drink making that would ensure successful accomplishment 
of the related tasks). As discussed in the literature review, when users have trouble while 
using an artifact, the artifact will likely get blamed, but successful use of an artifact will 
more likely result in the user getting credited with the intelligence required to complete 
the task (Pea, 1993). The results show that inherent focus in the walkthrough question 
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methods on internal versus external resources (whether implicit or explicit) exacerbated 
this known phenomenon. The following two figures provide examples of typical 
statements from the DCW and CW method groups that highlight the differences 
discussed above. 
 Statements from the CW method group show a focus on human responsibility for 
accomplishment of activity, but with positive connotation even when discussing potential 
usability issues. Focus of the resolution of the potential issue is typically on the assumed 
experience or training of the user, rather than on actionable statements regarding what 
could or should be changed with respect to future design choices.  
 Statements from the DCW method group show a focus on placing responsibility 
for potential usability issues on external resources as opposed to human users. In 
addition, an increase in the attribution of cognitive-related aspects of the activity to 
external resources can be seen in the language used. For example, the lack of a “way to 
remember” is related by the participant to there being “nothing written to provide what 
the user needs.” 
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“The user will know how to make the drink. One must assume that the employee can 
follow directions…There is no way to see if the drinks are being made correctly through 
feedback or otherwise. However if we assume the user knows how to make the drink, this 
is no big deal.” 
 
“He knows and understands coffee lingo.” 
 
“He will try to achieve the right effect because his job demands him to…He will know 
what to do based on what the customer ordered and his prior experience in making the 
drinks.” 
 
“The user understands how to make the drinks based off of their training.” 
 
“Should have had training or have written instructions for each drink.” 
 
“If he or she is properly trained, they will know how to write down the orders so that he 
or she can make them…Once again, if the worker is trained properly, they will know.” 
Figure 28. Statements from the CW method group that show focus on human 
responsibility for accomplishment 
 
 
 
“There is nothing written to provide what the user needs. No way to remember.” 
 
“It does not provide enough info…If the task is accomplished is because the worker has 
good memory or maybe write it down and is not because the clues from the 2 cups.” 
 
“They are only order details and nothing helps him have understanding of it. This is a 
problem if he forgets. They are only order details and nothing helps him have 
understanding of it.” 
 
“Nothing is marked with detail he may mix and match the orders accidentally because its 
not specified on the cup.” 
 
“The external representation only shows one criteria for the task. User has to store the 
entire order (aside from drink size) in his or her head.” 
 
“Information should have a sticker non-fat / skim just to make clear info to second 
worker.” 
Figure 29. Statements from the DCW method that show focus on external resources as 
being responsible for (lack of) accomplishment  
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Impact of walkthrough evaluation method on usability relevance. 
 
 A group of 2 experts were given the evaluation results from all participants from 
all of the experimental evaluation groups (including both Experiment 1 and 2). The 
results were made anonymous with respect to experimental group. The group of expert 
judges rated the usability relevance of the individual evaluations using a scale of 1–5. 
 
 The impact of walkthrough evaluation method (representing external versus 
internal cognitive focus) on usability relevance was explored through research question 
RQ 3.1: 
RQ 3.1: Is there a difference in usability relevance by walkthrough evaluation method? 
HYP 3.1: There is a difference in usability relevance by walkthrough evaluation method. 
 
 Usability relevance ratings for evaluations from the Distributed Cognitive 
Walkthrough (DCW) method group were significantly higher than usability relevance 
ratings for the Cognitive Walkthrough (CW) method group. 
 The DCW questions resulted in greater focus on the role of external information 
resources in the accomplishment of activity, as well as greater discussion of 
accomplishment beyond individual or current users. The CW questions focus more on 
existing internal user knowledge. Asking implicitly about the accomplishment of tasks 
(as in the DCW) as opposed to asking if the user will know how to do the task (as in the 
CW), leads to a richer discussion related to multiple, interacting resources that contribute 
to the accomplishment of an activity. For example, asking about previous work that could 
have been done by other users and future work that could be done by other users puts 
focus less on a single user, and puts focus more on use (accomplishment of the task). 
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Evaluations using the DCW questions resulted in more interpretation and the making 
visible of how (including where) accomplishment occurs. For example, the mention of a 
“3rd worker” by a DCW method group participant (see Figure X below) represents 
discussion of an implication that may occur in a context of use beyond what was 
provided in the experimental scenario, yet it does represent a situation that has been 
witnessed by the author in real world contexts of use. The following two figures show 
examples of typical statements from the DCW and CW method groups that highlight the 
differences in usability relevance discussed above. 
 
“Yes.” 
 
“Of course, the user's goal is always to please the customer.” 
 
“The user will be the one trying to achieve the task.” 
 
“Their job is to give customer what they want.” 
 
“Depends on the experience of the worker. Overall yes, they should have the drive to 
achieve.” 
Figure 30. Statements from the CW method group that show low usability relevance. 
 
 
 
“Nothing to compare to…If the person is new they may not know how to make the 
different drinks…Users memory may fail if too many orders. Attention may also be an 
issue…No way to verify what was done.” 
 
“A 3rd worker could not show up and make the two drinks correctly based on what is 
written on the cups.” 
 
“It is written on the cup - recognition rather than recall.” 
Figure 31. Statements from the DCW method that show higher usability relevance. 
represent usability related concepts. 
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 Evaluators generally have difficulty in seeing interactions of resources over 
interactional dimensions such as time, space, and people, with respect to task 
accomplishment. If initially asked about one resource (i.e., individual human user), it is 
likely that evaluative focus will stay on that resource. If asked about accomplishment, 
there is a greater chance of consideration of different resources that may contribute to 
accomplishment. 
 
 
Impact of number of users 
 
 The impact of different numbers of users (1 versus multiple) on the dependent 
variables was explored through the following research questions: 
 
RQ 1.2: Is there a difference in average usability severity ratings by number-of-users? 
HYP 1.2: There is a difference in average usability severity ratings by number-of-users  
 
RQ 2.2: Is there a difference in average usability severity ratings by number-of-users? 
HYP 2.2: There is a difference in average usability severity ratings by number-of-users. 
  
RQ 3.2: Is there a difference in usability relevance by number-of-users? 
HYP 3.2: There is a difference in usability relevance by number-of-users. 
  
RQ 5.2: Is there a difference in subjective perception of understandability of the method 
by number-of-users? 
HYP 5.2: There is a difference subjective perception of understandability of the method 
by number-of-users. 
 
 
 No significant differences were found for the impact of the number of users in a 
scenario on actionability, usability relevance, and participant reported usability severity. 
Although no significant differences were found for the impact of the number of users in a 
scenario, in the case of severity and actionability, interesting differences are noted in that 
the DCW method groups performed more consistently (near-equal means) than the CW 
groups across the differing number of users. This is discussed in the next chapter as 
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giving insight into possible robustness in the DCW method, with respect to context of use 
variations that could be explored in future research. 
 
8.4 Experiment 2 Results Discussion Section 
 
 Results from Experiment 1 showed that increased focus on external resources in 
evaluation questions lead to greater appreciation of the interacting elements that make up 
the context of use and better descriptions of how these interacting contributions of 
external and internal (cognitive) resources relate to usability. Experiment 2 complements 
this by exploring how the possible differences in focus on external resource contribution 
during evaluation may be differentially impacted by differences in the intended final 
materiality of the artifacts or services being evaluated. 
Experiment 2 addressed what impact differences in materiality can have on 
usability evaluation; not for differences in prototype materiality, but for differences in the 
intended final materiality of the finished artifact (i.e., a software interface versus a paper 
coffee cup). The cognitive science literature argues that gestures and everyday resources 
such as paper and pencil in many cases should be considered as part of the cognitive 
process. Experiment 2 attempts to find out if such ideas would be become more or less 
visible to evaluators given differences in the materiality of what is considered to be under 
evaluation. Key to this question though, which bears repeating often is that this may only 
be possible with the focus of evaluation being sufficiently directed to the external world, 
which the first experiment showed was possible using the DCW method. 
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 Our third high level research question shown below was explored in Experiment 
2: 
 
High Level RQ 3: How does the intended final materiality of the artifact or system being 
evaluated impact evaluation? 
 
Results for Experiment 2 show significant differences for the impact of 
materiality on participant reported usability severity. The digital materiality group 
resulted in higher severity means than the paper materiality group. 
 No significant differences were found for the impact of the materiality on 
actionability or usability relevance. Although no significant differences were found for 
actionability, the large effect size, partial eta squared = .146 (along with a “near-
significant” p value of .08) is at least as large as one, and larger than two of the effect 
sizes of the three significant differences found in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 used 
sample sizes half that of Experiment 1, and we feel that the large effect size found for the 
impact of materiality on actionability deserves noteworthy discussion. In addition to the 
large effect size, and near significant level, it is interesting that while in Experiment 1 all 
three dependent variables moved in the same direction, in Experiment 2 the reported 
severity moves in the opposite direction as the actionability and usability relevance. This 
is discussed later in this chapter, as well as in the next chapter (conclusions and future 
research).  This is one of the key interesting outcomes of this research, given the 
difficulty of making visible the (hard to see) interactions between internal and external 
resources. 
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Impact of materiality on usability severity reported by participants 
 
 The impact of materiality on reported severity was explored through the following 
research question: 
 
RQ 6.1: Is there a difference in average usability severity ratings by materiality? 
HYP 6.1: There is a difference in average usability severity ratings by materiality. 
 
 Participants in the digital materiality group reported significantly higher usability 
issue severity ratings than participants in the paper materiality group. We believe this 
result is based on higher expectations for the contribution of digital technology than from 
more everyday resources (such as paper based artifacts) towards the accomplishment of 
activity. What is very interesting here is that discussion of these everyday resources ends 
up being much richer than in the digital group. Even when the contributions of everyday 
resources are explicitly discussed, less blame with respect to usability is placed on them. 
This is explored further in the section that discusses the impact of materiality on other 
dependent variables. The following two figures show examples of typical statements 
from the digital and paper materiality groups that highlight these differences.  
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“The interface doesn't represent the options applied to the drink. 2%, whip, etc.” 
 
“Only visual size and drink type are available to the user. Size and type aren't the only 
things the user is concerned with.” 
 
“The system appears to cover drink type and size, though more order details would be 
nice. As stated above, certain details are missing from the display.” 
 
“The image shown to the second user displays some but not all of the relevant 
information.” 
 
“Presumably finished drinks will no longer appear on screen.” 
 
“No specific drink info available. User not apparently able to recover specifics.” 
Figure 32. Statements from the digital materiality group that represent a focus on 
technology being responsible for potential usability issues. In addition, these statements 
are generally lacking any consideration of how other non-high-tech resources (external or 
internal) might be expected to contribute. 
 
“The cups only communicate the size and "Mocha" - all other information is 
communicated verbally and could be easily forgotten, but given the pace of the 
environment and the limited number of things to remember, there is still a good chance of 
success, especially if the employee is experienced.” 
 
“Only Mocha and cup size is passed on non verbally.” 
 
“Information about the coffee, cream, milk, and espresso is omitted from the cup label. 
The second worker must rely entirely on memory to make the drink.” 
 
“The information about the type of drink. The options transfer from maker to orderer is 
purely verbal.” 
 
“The user receives no written order and must memorize it the first time it is called.” 
 
“It's represented by a cup full of liquid. I'm not sure it really applies to this situation as a 
system.” 
 
“I think so via the external representation of info (e.g., marking cup, calling drink) the 
user gains more experience in the proper way of doing so.” 
 
“Potentially if a customer ordered the same size with different options the drink could be 
confused. No external indication of difference leaves customer clueless.” 
Figure 33. Statements from the paper materiality group that represent a lesser focus on 
the existence of potential usability issues. 
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Impact of materiality on actionability, usability relevance, and attribution of the 
contribution of resources. 
 
 A group of 2 experts were given the evaluation results from all participants from 
all of the experimental evaluation groups (including both Experiment 1 and 2). The 
results were made anonymous with respect to experimental group. The group of expert 
judges rated both the actionability and the usability relevance of the individual 
evaluations using a scale of 1–5. 
 The impact of materiality on actionability, usability relevance, and attribution of 
the contribution of resources was explored through the following research questions: 
 
RQ 7.1: Is there a difference in actionability ratings by materiality? 
HYP 7.1: There is a difference in actionability ratings by materiality. 
 
RQ 8.1: Is there a difference in usability relevance by materiality? 
HYP 8.1: There is a difference in usability relevance by materiality. 
 
RQ 9.1: Is there a difference in attribution of responsibility of cognitive activity by 
materiality? 
HYP 9.1: There is a difference in attribution of responsibility of cognitive activity by 
materiality. 
 Evaluations from the paper materiality group resulted in non-significant higher 
actionability ratings, and non-significant higher usability relevance ratings, compared to 
evaluations from the digital materiality group.  
 Although no significant differences were found for actionability, the large effect 
size, partial eta squared = .146 (along with a “near-significant” p value of .08) is at least 
as large as one, and larger than two of the effect sizes of the three significant differences 
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found in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 used sample sizes half that of Experiment 1, and we 
feel that the large effect size found for the impact of materiality on actionability deserves 
noteworthy discussion. In addition to the large effect size, and near significant level, it is 
interesting that while in Experiment 1 all three dependent variables moved in the same 
direction, in Experiment 2 the reported severity moves in the opposite direction as the 
actionability and usability relevance. As discussed below in this section, as well as in the 
next chapter (Conclusions and Future Research) this is possibly the most interesting 
result of this research given the implications to making visible hard to see interactions 
between internal and external resources (assuming sufficient evaluative focus on the 
external world; such as when using the DCW method as shown in Experiment 1). 
 The DCW method focuses evaluation on external resources, which interacts with 
the inherent ambiguity and invisibility of the contribution of everyday resources to the 
accomplishment of an activity. The ambiguity present with respect to the contribution of 
everyday resources and people differs from the ambiguity that Buxton (Buxton, 2007) 
points to as influencing the interpretation of lower-than-final fidelity of sketches and 
prototypes, but has a similarly powerful effect. The ambiguity Buxton discusses as being 
present in many sketches and prototypes ironically leads to greater interpretation exactly 
because of what is left out. Similarly, ambiguity in exactly how task elements are being 
accomplished (differentially by materiality) leads to a necessity of an increase in 
interpretation by evaluators. As can be seen in the data examples below (Figure 34.), 
evaluations conducted by participants that used the digital solution tended to focus on the 
static presentation of task related information given by the digital order system. The 
lower actionability and usability relevance ratings for this group are reflected in lack of 
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discussion of the contribution of resources other than this digital display, as well as lack 
of discussion of how the information got there. 
 The data examples taken from the paper experimental group (Figure 35. below) 
reflect a greater focus on the contribution of many different resources (external and 
internal), resulting in a richer discussion of contextual elements. The inherent invisibility 
of the contribution of everyday resources (relative to the visibility of the digital screen in 
the digital group) represents ambiguity with respect to resource contribution that must be 
disambiguated through interpretation of how (including where) accomplishment occurs.  
 What is important to note is that while research and representations such as 
Distributed Cognitive Tasks (Zhang & Norman, 1994) may explain bias in differing 
isomorphs that impact real use, our results presented here show that materiality of the 
external and internal resource that realize a given isomorph matter for the evaluation 
(which is a prediction of real use). Bias in real use of an artifact is shown by Zhang and 
Norman (1994) and Gray and Boehm-Davis (2000), while bias in evaluation due to 
intended materiality differences impacts evaluators. 
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“The system appears to cover drink type and size, though more order details would be 
nice.” 
 
“The specifics about the drink are not presented.” 
 
“There is not enough information presented. Could cause confusion.” 
 
“It shows a graphical representation showing type of drink and size.” 
 
“The interface doesn't represent the options applied to the drink. 2%, whip, etc.” 
 
“It has the size and name of the drinks, but not the extras, like non-fat, no whip, etc. It 
would be simple to add these options to the order screen, and make it much easier to 
make the drink correctly.” 
 
“Doesn't show the specifics of each of the drinks, i.e., 2%, milk vs. non fat. User cannot 
refer to system for any help other than general type of drink. Could get drinks wrong if 
forgets.” 
Figure 34. Examples of statements from evaluations in the digital group that lack 
discussion of the contribution of different resources to activity accomplishment. 
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“The cups only communicate the size and "Mocha" - all other information is 
communicated verbally and could be easily forgotten, but given the pace of the 
environment and the limited number of things to remember, there is still a good chance of 
success, especially if the employee is experienced.” 
 
“Only Mocha and cup size is passed on non verbally.” 
 
“Information about the coffee, cream, milk, and espresso is omitted from the cup label. 
The second worker must rely entirely on memory to make the drink.” 
 
“The information about the type of drink. The options transfer from maker to orderer is 
purely verbal.” 
 
“The user receives no written order and must memorize it the first time it is called.” 
 
“It's represented by a cup full of liquid. I'm not sure it really applies to this situation as a 
system.” 
 
“I think so via the external representation of info (e.g., marking cup, calling drink) the 
user gains more experience in the proper way of doing so.” 
 
“Potentially if a customer ordered the same size with different options the drink could be 
confused. No external indication of difference leaves customer clueless.” 
Figure 35. Examples of statements from evaluations in the paper cup group, reflecting a 
greater focus on the contribution of many different resources (external and internal), 
resulting in a richer discussion of contextual elements and accomplishment. 
 
 
 
8.5 Summary of all results from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 
 
 Experiment 1 showed interesting (and significant) results based on differentially 
fostering the focus of evaluation between external versus internal resources. Experiment 
1 showed that fostering the unpacking of the contribution of external and internal 
resources with respect to the accomplishment of (cognitive) activity can lead to beneficial 
differences in actionability and usability relevance of evaluation results, and in reported 
severity. 
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 Experiment 2 showed interesting (and sometimes significant) results based on 
differing intended final materiality of an artifact being evaluated. Experiment 2 showed 
that this consideration of differences in materiality could lead to useful discussion of 
otherwise invisible elements of accomplishment. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The most important goal of usability-related fields is the creation of products and 
services that conform to how people accomplish things, and how people think. Therefore, 
many usability related methodologies are based on theories of human cognition. Recent 
differing views within the cognitive science field are not represented in current usability 
methodologies; specifically, current methods are based on more cognitivist theories, with 
almost no representation for distributed and extended cognitive theoretical views. 
This research represents a first step towards understanding how differences 
between theories of cognition can be related to the practical work of designing artifacts 
both useful and usable. Such practical work falls under many names, such as user 
experience, usability, and interaction design. Specifically this research focused on 
differences noticeable in the results of walkthrough usability evaluation methods which 
differed in underlying theoretical bases (cognitivist versus distributed cognitive views). 
This chapter discusses conclusions that can be drawn from this research as well as 
possibilities for future research, some known prior to this research (but not feasible), and 
many others that became known because of this research. 
While the following eight sections further discuss conclusions and future research 
topics in more depth, the following brief recommendations are given, for both researchers 
and practitioners, based not only on the results of the experimental studies, but as well 
from what has been learned conducting this research. These recommendations are further 
elaborated in the following eight sections. 
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Recommendations for practitioners 
 
1.  Increase evaluation and design attention on the cognitive role of the external 
world, but beware of noticing only the high-tech as relevant. Because many of 
the most useful and usable artifacts simply become invisible over time (and people 
then get credit for successful use), it is important to proactively pay greater attention 
to the possible role that multiple external resources are playing; moreover, in many 
cases, it is the interactions between multiple resources that are actually enabling 
success (or failure), rather than the resources themselves. Therefore, practice should 
move towards using representations that highlight interactions over time and space 
between multiple resources. For example, service blueprints, used in service design 
are a good role model for most work in interaction design. Popular representations 
in usability work such as wireframes that focus more on static views of interactions 
need to be complemented with better representations of the dynamic aspects of 
cognitive accomplishment. Finally, as this research has shown, we need to beware 
of the trap of noticing only the most high-tech artifacts in the situation, and 
subsequently failing to continue to look for other more everyday resources that may 
be contributing to accomplishment. 
 
2.  Do not practice user-centered design as user-bound design. Extended cognitive 
literature shows us that not all of cognitive processing that takes place is known to 
the individual person. Therefore, we should not expect users to be able to articulate 
how they accomplish things; the risk is that when asked, people will make up 
realistic explanations regardless, making it difficult to distinguish between the 
known and the made up. Andy Clark points out that we can think of cognition as 
being organism-centered even when not organism-bound; analogously for design 
and evaluation, we should focus on a user-centered, but not user-bound approach. 
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Recommendations for researchers 
 
1.  Leverage representations for complex interactions from more mature fields. 
Representations and methods from other fields, such as complexity science (study of 
emergence) and self-organizing systems that are used to represent multiple 
interactions over time, can be leveraged for the representations of interactions 
between internal and external cognitive resources. Ideally, representations should 
make visible what we do not know, by allowing us to lay down what is known, and 
then visually highlight otherwise would-be invisible implications. Currently, 
representations used in user-centered design practice do not fill this useful role, and 
instead focus on communicating what is already clearly known. Research is needed 
to understand which elements of representations taken from other fields may be 
useful in filling this current gap in usability related evaluation and design. 
 
2.  Vary experimental study size, number, and timing. The use of two separate 
studies in this research resulted in us noticing interesting results (e.g., possible 
impact of materiality on actionability and usability relevance) that may have been 
overlooked if the same variables were studied using instead a single, larger 
experimental design. We believe that future research related to the impact of theory 
on usability related practice should go even further, using a methodological 
triangulation of sorts; it may be useful to employ both brief and longitudinal 
complementary experimental designs as part of one research endeavor, allowing the 
exploration of the same variables in different conceptual dimensions. 
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9.1 Paradox of useful, usable, yet invisible things 
 
Some of the most useful and usable resources become invisible with respect to 
their contribution to the accomplishment of an activity, especially activities that would be 
called acts of intelligence (Pea, 2004). This section discusses reasons for this invisibility, 
as well as noting that invisibility can show up in a different ways, with differing impact 
on the evaluation and design concepts relevant to this research. 
 The invisibility of usable resources has been previously discussed in much 
literature related to designing for usability (Norman, 1990; Norman, 1993; Norman, 
1998) as well as design in general (Alexander, 1979). Norman and Alexander take similar 
positions, stating that usable aspects are invisible relative to more noticeable aspects that 
frustrate us during use of a product, service, or physical space. Norman (Norman, 1990; 
Norman, 1993; Norman, 1998) focuses on the idea that features of products that are 
usable are not noticed, and that a major goal of designing for usability is to try to end up 
with such invisible products. Alexander (Alexander, 1979) says that misfit between a 
design and its context of use is much easier to notice than fit, and therefore we should 
focus on design as a process of removing negative aspects found through evaluation 
(whether this evaluation is implicitly based on design hunches based on experience, or 
based on a more explicit form of evaluation). Alexander prescribes the use of design 
patterns, which show generally applicable solutions to common problems. Such patterns 
are a representation of design knowledge (experience) that focuses on showing how a 
solution resolves the noticeable negative misfit between a design and its context of use. 
Alexander promotes application of such design patterns by iterating the process of 
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applying design choices, looking for newly exposed misfits, then yet again selecting an 
appropriate design pattern that could resolve the misfit. 
Bringing in concepts from the distributed and extended cognitive literature allows 
us to go beyond this initial notion of the invisibility of usable things. The evolution of the 
usefulness of a resource can shed light on how the contribution of a resource can become 
both invisible and in many cases misappropriated to other resources; most relevant to this 
research is the case where this misappropriation occurs between human and non-human 
resources, or even between brain and non-brain (but still intra-body) resources. 
Pea (1993, p. 53) states, “objects…have become so deeply a part of our 
consciousness that we do not notice them. Turned from history into nature, they are 
invisible, un-‘remarkable’ aspects of our experiential world.” Over time then, resources 
that may seem like high technology (very noticeable during use), evolve to being 
considered more everyday resources. “These tools literally carry intelligence in them, in 
that they represent some individual’s or some community’s decision that the means thus 
offered should be reified, made stable, as a quasi-permanent form, for use by others” 
(Pea, 1993, p. 53). When a change in status of a resource occurs, from remarkable to 
unremarkable, what is then at risk is the misattribution of resource contribution to the 
accomplishment of intelligent acts. 
A more wicked (Rittel & Webber, 1973) form of invisibility of the contribution of 
resources to the accomplishment of intelligent activity becomes apparent when trying to 
account for Clark’s (2007) emphasis on cognition being accomplished via ephemeral 
loops of information flow between external and internal resources. This is wicked in that 
even more difficult than noticing the contribution of tangible resources, we somehow 
  
 
   
          
 
 
  
  136   
need to be able to notice these intangible functional loops of information flow, which 
Clark considers as proper systems of cognition that come and go, changing over 
sometimes small amounts of time. 
 We have now moved beyond just the simpler views of the invisibility of usable 
resources to more interesting yet complicated views of invisibility of the cognitive 
contribution of resources given by the extended cognitive view. We can now relate this to 
our current research by discussing the impact of this paradox of invisibility to the 
evaluation and design process. First, difficulty of seeing the contribution of resources to 
accomplishment of an activity has obvious impact on the evaluation of a product or 
service. If a particular resource is responsible in some way for a positive or negative 
outcome, but is effectively invisible to the evaluation process, responsibility will be 
inevitably placed on different resources that may not actually be the true contributors. 
Relevant to this research would be the example where positive accomplishment of an 
activity is credited to the human user, because resources key to accomplishment are 
simply overlooked. 
 Beyond the impact of invisibility on evaluation, this paradox of useful and usable 
things can greatly impact the development of design alternatives. Simply put, the 
resources that would be most expected by a designer to offer positive contributions to an 
interaction will be most likely to become part of a designed solution. The paradox-
induced invisibility can impact such design choices in two ways. First, related to the 
above discussion, if a designer has been unable to notice the contribution of a resource in 
the past, it is unlikely that the resource will show up in future designs. Second, another 
wicked case shows up having to do with intangible interactions that occur over time in 
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ways that are hard to predict. Going against the well known common sense phrase “two 
wrongs don’t make a right, it may actually be the case that for many interactions over 
time, at least across different levels of usability and user experience, many wrongs may 
lead to a right. In many cases during both design and evaluation, single lower level 
interactions are considered piecewise, with the goal of designing usable (efficient, 
resource minimizing) interactions. The focus on individual interactions (or at least only a 
few at a time) is in many cases due to cognitive limitations of designers and their 
processes (designers may only be able to think about and represent a small number of 
interactions at a time). Clark (2001, p. 5) states that “mindfulness is just matter, nicely 
orchestrated.” It may be the case that a good orchestration of internal and external 
cognitive resources over time will be overlooked if each of the low level interactions 
involving these resources would be deemed inefficient. 
For example, consider the real world task of keeping track of multiple coffee 
drink orders as reflected in the coffee shop scenario used for our research experiments. It 
could be seen as inefficient to design to use markers to stop and write drink order 
information on the paper cup, when time has already been taken to verbally take the 
order, enter the order into the computerized cash register, and even verbally transmit the 
order to other workers (in the case of multiple workers). This can seem even more 
inefficient when it is the case where an individual worker will both take the order and 
make the drink. Many fast-food companies take the order at the register, then transmit the 
order info on multiple computer monitors viewable by workers later in the order prep 
process, while some rely almost entirely on internal cognitive resources (the workers 
have to remember the orders). The use of markers to write directly on the cups, ends up 
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serving as a very robust (good) design in the face of many uncertainties during the drink 
preparation process, such as changes in orders, rapid changes in environmental noise and 
co-worker availability, and rapid changes in order volume. Such use of everyday, low-
tech resources may be invisible to designers. 
Future efforts in both research and integration of research results into practical 
methods and processes are necessary to better understand how to deal with this paradox 
of useful, usable, yet in many ways invisible resources. Later sections in this chapter 
more specifically address related issues, based both on the current research results, and 
directions for future research. 
 
9.2 External Resources as Cognitive Resources 
 
Recent cognitive science literature (Clark, 2007) points to the role of gestures, 
paper (and other everyday external resources), as part of the thought (cognitive) process. 
The goal of our research was not to get involved in the ongoing debate regarding whether 
or not such external resources should in fact be considered part of the human thought 
process, but instead to note the literature in cognitive science, and explore the relevance 
for evaluation and design of usable interactive artifacts and systems. 
The role of the external environment in the cognitive process has been a topic for 
debate for decades. Hebert Simon only went as far as saying that looking at the 
environment can give clues to how hard a problem solving task will be for a human (i.e., 
the task environment constrains or defines the task). 
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Gray (2006) quotes Simon (1956): 
 “Now if an organism is confronted with the problem of behaving approximately  
rationally, or adaptively, in a particular environment, the kinds of simplifications  
that are suitable may depend not only on the characteristics – sensory, neural, and  
other – of the organism, but equally upon the structure of the environment. Hence,  
we might hope to discover, by a careful examination of some of the fundamental  
structural characteristics of the environment, some further clues as to the nature of  
the approximating mechanisms used in decision making.” (Simon, 1956, pp. 129-  
130)” 
  
 Simon and even Norman (1993) focus on the environment’s role (relative to 
cognition) as one of shaping cognition, whereas Clark places a more integral role of the 
environment in cognitive activity, which can be taken as saying external resources are 
literally part of the cognitive process. Wenger (1999) gives advice that may be applicable 
about not being able to design learning and instead the goal should be only go as far as 
trying to foster learning. A similar argument can be made about the goal of designing for 
usability, and especially for user experience. It may be much more realistic to have a goal 
of designing resources that together with already existing resources foster good user 
experiences, rather than trying to actually design explicit user experience outcomes. 
 Simon values the “examination of the structure of the environment” with the goal 
of understanding how the constraints represented by the environment (extra-brain 
resources), can give a prediction of the type of “decision making” that will occur. A 
restating of this with the extended mind view (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) could be to 
instead say that the examination of the environment instead makes visible the potential 
contribution of the environmental resources to future cognitive acts; i.e., the environment 
not only shapes a cognitive act, it is sometimes part of it. Therefore, an extended-
cognitive restating of Simon’s comments on examination of the environment would be 
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that examining resources external to the human brain can give us insight into what 
possible future orchestrations of external and internal cognitive resources may be fostered 
by design choices (either positively or negatively with respect to our design goals). For 
example, looking into a workplace and noticing the absence of whiteboards (or similar 
shared, public writing resources) may give you the sense that certain types of cognitive 
activity will or will not be fostered for users of the workplace. 
Integrating distributed cognitive views into practical evaluation and design 
methods and processes is best done in a manner that tries to create designs that foster 
distributed cognitive activity; i.e., try to enable the same type of freedom in choosing 
external cognitive resources that people have become accustomed to in the real world 
(e.g., the power of the post-it note is partially due to its flexibility and openness). 
 
9.3 (User-centered) Design should not be practiced as user-bound design. 
 
User-Centered Design (UCD) practices tend to reflect cognitivist views, focusing 
on phrases such as “involve the user early in the design process,” “ask the users what 
they need,” and “you are not the user.” Much of this is because of the lack of prescription 
for practice coming from the research world. If underlying theory fails to offer explicit 
prescription for practice, then a practitioner has to fill in the gaps where prescription is 
missing, leading to practices based on common sense (which in many cases is incorrect) 
interpretations of what “user-centered” means. 
Even within the group of researchers and philosophers that argue for 
consideration of the environment as part of the cognitive process, there is of course 
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disagreement about how far to take it (Clark, 2007). Clark (2007) argues that it is 
dangerous to accept the weaker view of non-brain resources as at best external tools 
useful during cognitive acts, dubbed the HEMC (the Hypothesis of Embedded 
Cognition), and instead it is important to hold fast to the stronger HEC (Hypothesis of 
Extended Cognition). The HEC, a stronger view of the extended mind argues for external 
resources as truly part of the cognitive process, through construction and coordination of 
ephemeral loops of information flow between external and internal resources. Clark, a 
strong proponent of the more radical HEC view does give in a bit saying that although 
there may be in some cases no functional difference between roles played by external and 
internal resources, the human (brain) should still be seen as having a more special role 
overall in the cognitive process; he states that cognition can be said to be “organism-
centered.” Even when giving in to the centrality of the human in the cognitive process, 
Clark does so still with a focus on the proper placement of external resources in 
cognition. Clark summarizes this with his Hypothesis of Organism-Centered Cognition 
(HOC), which he states as “Human cognitive processing (sometimes) literally extends 
into the environment surrounding the organism. But the organism (and within the 
organism, the brain/CNS) remains the core and currently the most active element. 
Cognition is organism-centered even when it is not organism-bound” (Clark, 2007, pp. 
192). 
This distinction between organism-centered and organism-bound cognition has 
direct useful application to the idea of how user-centered design is typically 
inappropriately practiced; user-centered design is too often practiced (and considered to 
be) as user-bound design. This distinction between user-centered and user-bound is in 
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many ways the same as saying use-centered (as opposed to user-centered), but may be a 
better way of relating to existing UCD practice. Because given the current buy-in to UCD 
practices, presenting a use-centered design view based on the extended cognitive view as 
yet another completely different process may lead to no adoption at all. If we were 
though to come up with a new name, “interaction-centered design,” may be better than 
use-centered because what’s important is the interaction(s) between resources (over time, 
space, representation, etc), more so than what and where the resources are. 
 
9.4 Does HEC versus HEMC even matter for practice? 
 
Clark (2007) argues that from a cognitive science viewpoint, it is dangerous to 
accept the weaker view of non-brain cognitive resources, such as the HEMC (the 
Hypothesis of Embedded Cognition), and instead it is important to hold fast to the 
stronger HEC (Hypothesis of Extended Cognition) that argues for external resources as 
truly part of the cognitive process (through construction and coordination of ephemeral 
cognitive loops). His concerns towards implications of acceptance of the weaker HEMC 
in the cognitive science field are really philosophical concerns, and represent the 
difference in the philosophical nature of cognitive science that can be contrasted with the 
more applied nature of human-computer interaction research. Therefore there may be a 
difference in implications for those concerned instead with the more practical (as opposed 
to philosophical) evaluation and design fields. It may be the case that both the HEC and 
HEMC, when applied to interaction design, have much less of a resultant difference. It 
may be possible to apply the more intuitive (and less radical) views of HEMC in the 
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evaluation and design of artifacts and systems with no appreciable loss in usability or 
user experience. This would mean that we may be able to get the benefits of viewing 
external resources as contributing (positively and negatively) to intelligent, cognitive 
activity, but without having to deal with the baggage that comes with the HEC vs. HEMC 
arguments in cognitive science. The DCW method used in our experiments sits 
somewhere in between the HEC and HEMC, due to practicality of what can be 
represented in a simple, four-question walkthrough method, rather than due to any 
philosophical choosing of sides in the HEC vs. HEMC argument. 
Future research using evaluation and design instruments other than walkthrough 
methods could be used to explore this issue, moving past the cognitivist versus post-
cognitivist interest, towards looking at how differences in views in the post-cognitivist 
areas differ in implications for evaluation and design, both in practice and in the usability 
of resultant designs. For example, experimental instruments can be based on the 
integration of distributed and extended cognitive representations into design artifacts and 
stakeholder-mediating deliverables (shared with both clients and co-workers) already 
used in interaction design and evaluation, such as wireframes (annotations regarding 
cognition related implications can be used alongside already used annotations), and with 
service design blueprints (isomorphic representations of service choices can be 
enumerated and evaluated). 
 This research has shown that even simple changes in walkthrough questions to 
place more focus on the contribution of external resources can have positive impact on 
evaluation. There are still issues to explore related to how much of the extended and 
distributed cognitive theoretical views can be placed into such methods before a point of 
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diminishing returns is reached. A major concern would be that if too much of the 
unintuitive aspects of such theories become visible to the practitioner, would the methods 
be used as all. For example, disagreements over whether or not external resources could 
be considered cognitive may lead to too much time arguing the plausibility of HEC vs. 
HEMC, rather than time spent using either view. 
 
9.5 Design and evaluate with alternate materials in mind for the end product 
 
It is already well known (Buxton, 2007) that the materiality and fidelity of a 
prototype can impact evaluation. For example, a working piece of software may invite 
fewer critiques, especially more minor comments, than a paper prototype because there 
may be an assumption that if the prototype is already realized in software, it is too late to 
nitpick over little issues, while a paper prototype may not act as such a barrier to 
comments. Our research addressed what impact materiality can have on usability 
evaluation, not for differences in prototype materiality, but for differences in the intended 
materiality of the finished artifact (i.e., a software interface versus a paper coffee cup). 
 Beyond the issue mentioned above regarding how different materiality and 
fidelity of prototypes can invite differing types of evaluative comments, another 
important distinction exists when looking at intended materiality of an artifact. The issue 
of how perception of contributions to activity may differ related to materiality. In the 
extreme, a low perception of contribution by an artifact that is actually enabling 
accomplishment could be expressed by saying that the contribution of the artifact is 
“invisible” (Pea, 1993; Norman, 1998). As discussed earlier, a paradox of sorts is thus 
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created with on one hand the view that usable things become invisible (we tend to notice 
what doesn’t work), while on the other hand, we still want to be able to evaluate the 
positive contribution to usability by such invisible artifacts. In some cases, the user of 
such an invisible artifact may in fact be credited with the positive contribution rather than 
the artifact itself. Don Norman in his book titled, “Things that make us smart.” (Norman, 
1993) shows how use of knowledge in the world can aid humans in accomplishing tasks. 
We should be careful though that when evaluating the contributions of people and 
artifacts to not misplace the credit; i.e., we are not made smarter by use of the artifacts, so 
a more reality-reflecting title for Norman’s topic would be “Things that make us look 
smart,” (though that is what Norman discusses). 
Different forms (materiality and other dimensions of the interaction) of mediation 
will make visible different aspects of the interaction, thus making visible different issues 
related to usability. Even when the final materiality and form of a product or service is 
known, it may be beneficial to try out evaluation and design considering multiple 
alternatives. Our research has shown that feedback can differ not only with the fidelity 
and form of the prototype, but the perceived intended final form has an impact as well, 
and therefore should be reflected in the design process. 
 
9.6 Representations of distributed and extended cognitive concepts in usability 
practice 
 
The role of representations in design and evaluation practice should be to show 
possible implications of design choices that may not otherwise be made known. While 
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this current research focused on experimentation using walkthrough evaluation questions 
applied to context of use scenarios, there are many other possibilities for integration of 
cognitive theory in the related fields of practice. Two big questions for future research are 
1) what are useful and usable representations of cognition, especially distributed and 
extended views for practitioners, and 2) where in the existing practical process will these 
representations have the best chance to be taken up and actually used? 
Many boundary objects exist in practical design and evaluation, given that work is 
usually divided among team members with differing roles, therefore requiring at a 
minimum for there to be handover of information, and at best multi-role discussion about 
shared ideas. Mediation between different roles in evaluation and design (e.g., human 
factors, design, development, business analyst) currently occur around representations 
such as wireframes, usability test reports, service design blueprints, and product behavior 
specifications. 
 We see two related areas for future research related to trying to understand issues 
related to integration of cognitive theory into representations of use currently used in 
practice. First, the viability of introducing new symbols to be integrated into current 
representations can be explored. For example, it is common practice to use swimlanes in 
system engineering representations that show workflow between system components and 
humans. Similarly, in service design work, service blueprints are commonly used with 
the goal of concretely showing how and when service touchpoints are accomplished. It 
may be possible to find useful variations on representations such as distributed cognitive 
task representations (Zhang & Norman, 1994) to show allocations to external and internal 
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resources, or representations of Clark’s (2007) ephemeral information loops with the goal 
of making these hard to see loops more visible in the design process. 
 It may not be practically possible to integrate new symbology, or even new uses 
of current symbols into currently used representations. Therefore, a second area of future 
research could look into applying questions such as those in the Distributed Cognitive 
Walkthrough method, posed against different existing representations to bring in context 
of use, extension of cognition, etc. to possibly lead to new ways to make implications of 
design choices visible. 
 
9.7 Modeling of what-if scenarios based on distributed and extended cognitive views 
 
Analysis of what-if alternative sets of design choices is difficult, given the large 
number of uncertainties related to elements such as complex contexts of use, and 
differences in users.  An even more difficult, and often overlooked part of conducting 
what-if analyses is the coming up with all of the alternative what-if scenarios to analyze. 
Left to their own devices, many designers may only generate scenarios which are tied 
strongly to their biases (e.g., high-tech or cognitivist tunnel vision). Clark (2001, p. 5) 
eloquently states, “mindfulness is just matter, nicely orchestrated;” why would we expect 
that designers, unaided against strong bias will suffice in coming up with the unintuitive 
(and in many different ways invisible) orchestrations that would make good use of 
available external and internal resources for cognitive activity. 
Techniques such as evolutionary algorithms (Bentley, 2001) are good candidates 
for use to find such unintuitive orchestrations of available resources (i.e., different 
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ephemeral, distributed cognitive system isomorphs) that can accomplish the desired 
activity. Use of such tools would best be employed as human in the loop evolution, where 
designers iterate ideas with the tool allowing easier integration of design and business 
(and other) constraints, as opposed to the oft ill-fated alternative of expecting such tools 
to just go off and find solutions with only initial input from a designer. Additionally, 
techniques such as agent-based modeling (Eden, 2007) can be leveraged to analyze 
interactions between human and non-human resources over relevant dimensions (time, 
space, etc). Current research and practical work in integrating cognitive models (based on 
more cognitivist views) with more qualitative modeling techniques (such as agent-based 
modeling) shows promise that could be applied to some of the issues in areas of user 
experience and service design discussed earlier. 
 
9.8 Guidance for cognition related implications needed for both novices and experts 
 
As stated above, a future research question to explore is which representations 
and methods currently used in user-centered design would be good candidates for 
integration with extended and distributed cognitive views? This section explores a bit 
further some of the issues related to differing guidance needed by both novices and 
experts. 
Of course, novices need guidance with respect to both choosing appropriate 
cognitive theories to apply, as well as with respect to how to integrate these cognitive 
theories into concrete practice. Interestingly, experts in both as these areas may be as 
much in need of guidance as novices. It is clear that novices need guidance because of a 
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lack of experience, but ironically it is the existence of vast experience and knowledge that 
leads to experts needing guidance, especially for the application of extended cognitive 
theories. Based on these fundamental differences in the need for guidance, the type of 
guidance may differ for novices and experts; like many questions raised here, this may 
best be explored empirically as future research. It is likely though that even with differing 
reasons for needing guidance, certain forms of design and cognitive theory information 
will support both novices with their lack of design experience, as well as experts who 
may be too set in their ways without guidance to get past a cognitivist bias. Design 
patterns (Alexander, 1979) are a good candidate representation of both design and 
cognitive theory information, representing what to apply and how to apply it concretely. 
Beyond obvious reasons for wanting novices of any field to be able to easily 
become acquainted with the ideas and methods used in a community of practice, there are 
specific concerns today in the interaction design and usability fields. Many jobs in these 
fields are currently at the senior level, because in many cases the work is being done by 
consultants, partly because many companies do not yet have internal departments capable 
of such work. High expectations held by clients (due to high hourly rates common in 
hiring specialist consultants) do not leave much room for novices to “try out” the field, or 
get experience through on the job training. As companies are becoming increasingly 
aware of the value of good design and usability across almost all types of products and 
services, increasing numbers of novices are coming into the workforce, through small but 
increasing numbers of academic programs, or through crossover from other disciplines. 
While the increasing need for usable design, and the increasing numbers of new 
practitioners interested in the work would seem good on the surface, there is a growing 
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concern by more experienced practitioners. For a young field that is still fighting hard for 
credibility, there is a concern that the increasing number of novices out there will result in 
many high-profile cases of poor work, leading quickly to a deflation in the perceived 
value, and specifically low return on investment. 
Literature available to novices that could be categorized as cognitive science 
literature will likely be based on more traditional (cognitivist) theory, based simply on 
proportion of theory in academic and popular science publications and media. Many 
business and real world factors add to the difficulties faced by novice practitioners in 
making sense of the methodological landscape that is UCD, and these factors will usually 
lead to use of the status quo of methods, regardless of the existence of more appropriate 
methods and views of cognition. Cognitivist and common sense (folk-cognitive) views 
are easier to implement in the daily work practice, also because working quickly is in 
many cases rewarded more than the ability to apply appropriate theory. A positive 
feedback loop is likely that encourages use of applied theory that is easier to access, 
easier to digest, and easier to get buy-in on from clients. For example, while many HCI 
textbooks, and even popular science articles on user-centered design methods strongly 
advise against the use of focus groups (as well as many forms of non-user stakeholder 
interviews) for the elicitation of quality UCD data, clients often push for such activities, 
sales people often sell these ideas, and so on, sometimes only because these are activities 
that are easy to understand, and easy to sell at budget meetings. Many such decisions are 
made using intuition about how humans think, and such decisions based on intuition will 
lead to use of guessing-based folk cognitive views. 
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Even with the many difficulties described above related to getting new theories of 
cognition into the everyday practice, and the fact that many different issues exist for both 
novices (under-experienced) and experts (possibly over-experienced), there is hope. This 
research shows that even simple guidance (in the form of questions) can have an impact 
on evaluation (and therefore design). As the saying goes, you can feed a man a fish or 
you can teach a man to fish; this research shows that it may be possible using simple 
variations or extensions to currently used methods to teach a practitioner to fish (evaluate 
and design based on distributed/extended cognition), possibly without the practitioner 
having to realize the theories even exist (i.e., imbue the methods with elements of the 
theory, without being so pushy as to make the methods look strange and confusing). Once 
the practitioners realize the amount and quality of fish (good design) that result, maybe 
then they will seek out more information regarding the underlying theory. Future research 
in the area of useful guidance for the application of differing theories of cognition in the 
design process could look at differences in perceptions based on differences in academic 
and professional training and experience, as well as how best to apply these ideas in 
differing corporate political climates. 
 What students (novice HCI practitioners) learn to recognize using methods in 
courses and on the job will carry over in the more fast paced real world of design and 
evaluation (i.e., residual effect of using methods). Experts may not use walkthrough 
methods once they are experts, but how they practice is affected by their prior use of 
these methods, and therefore impacted by the underlying theoretical foundation of these 
methods. Access to everyday places (coffee shops, supermarkets, our living rooms) 
reflected in the experimental scenarios used for our research can help us learn things that 
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can be useful in more access-sensitive, time and safety critical domains found in military 
and healthcare settings. Interestingly, some coffee shops and retail services and related 
artifacts are better designed than systems that have had much more time and money spent 
on design (e.g., military systems). Methods such as the DCW used by students in HCI 
courses can help them make future systems in these more time and safety critical contexts 
better. Selection of the coffee shop task scenario for our research was not trivial. 
Similarity of complexity of some tasks between a drive-thru coffee shop (which is easily 
accessible to study) and an airplane cockpit (which is not easy to get access to) is 
something that can be leveraged to better educate future usability practitioners. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this research represents the comparison of current differing views 
in the cognitive science field applied to usability practice through the comparison of 
walkthrough usability evaluation methods based on cognitivist and post-cognitivist 
theories of cognition. Results of this comparison have shown that an increased focus on 
the interaction between external and internal resources can benefit evaluation with 
respect to actionability, usability relevance, and reported severity. In addition, similar 
benefits are possible by differing the materiality of what is being evaluated. This aspect 
of addressing the paradoxical invisibility of useful and usable artifacts is a key 
contribution of this research, showing how even simple differences in evaluation and 
design methods can aid in making visible these complex interactions between internal 
and external resources for cognition. 
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